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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The State appeals from the dismissal of charges of distribution of a controlled 
substance, a first degree felony; possession of a controlled substance, a second 
degree felony; possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class B 
misdemeanor; and obstruction of justice, a class A misdemeanor. This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(i) (West Supp. 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Where Defendant was experienced in the criminal justice system, 
volunteered to read his Miranda rights to himself rather than have them given 
orally, completed an Admonition of Rights Form, and then confirmed that he 
understood his rights, did the trial court err in ruling that Defendant was not 
adequately advised of his Miranda rights merely because he talked about extraneous 
issues while he completed the Form? 
Preservation. This issue was preserved by the State's opposition to 
Defendant's motion to suppress. R. 54-50; R. 113:passim; R. HV.passim. 
Standard of Review. This Court "review[s] for correctness a trial court's 
ultimate ruling regarding the validity of a Miranda waiver, while 'granting some 
degree of discretion to the trial court because of the wide variety of factual settings 
possible/" State v. Bybee, 2000 UT 43, f 16,1 P.3d 1087 (quoting State v. Dutchie, 969 
P.2d 422,427 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted)). Such discretion is limited, however, 
where, as here, a recording of the defendant's custodial interrogation is included in 
the record, since this Court then "stands in the same position as the trial court in 
reviewing the [recording] of the interrogation," State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894,898 
(Utah App. 1983). This Court "review[s] for clear error the trial court's findings of 
fact underlying the waiver." Id. 
2. Did the trial court err in denying the State's timely pretrial motion to 
briefly reopen the suppression hearing, where the State omitted, but did not 
purposefully withhold, crucial evidence at the initial hearing? 
Preservation. This issue was preserved by the State's written motion to reopen 
the suppression hearing and the trial court's denial thereof. R. 70-69; R. 122:3-9. To 
the extent the issue was not preserved, the State argues plain error. 
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Standard of Review. Whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard 
in denying a timely pretrial motion to reopen a suppression hearing is a question of 
law reviewed for correctness. See State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, f 31, 37 P.3d 1073. 
Otherwise, a trial court's denial of a motion to reopen is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. See Ross v. Leftwich, 14 Utah 2d 71,377 P.2d 495,497 (1963). 
"To demonstrate plain error, [appellant] must establish that (i) an error exists; 
(ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant." State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, f 15,95 P.3d 276 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following provisions, relevant to this appeal, are attached at Addendum 
A: United States Const. Amend. V; Utah R. Crim. P. 24. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
and 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On March 9,2007, at 11:21 p.m., Joshua Ruzicka was found dead from a drug 
overdose in Highland, Utah. R. 54; R. 126:13:46:50. At the time, Mr. Ruzicka had 
heroin, cocaine, and morphine in his blood. R. 54. Defendant found Mr. Ruzicka 
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and called the police to report his death. R. 54; R. 126:13:48:55-49:06. Police officers 
spoke with Defendant at the scene but did not detain him. R. 54. 
On May 1,2007, Defendant was arrested on unrelated drug charges. R. 113:7. 
In connection with that arrest, Defendant was transported to the Lehi Police 
Department. Id. 
While at the police station, Defendant met with Detective Moosman about Mr. 
Ruzicka's death. R. 113:12; R. 126 (video of Defendant's interview attached at 
Addendum B). Defendant and Detective Moosman had already discussed Mr. 
Ruzicka's death on several occasions. R. 126:13:37:46-13:37:50. 
After Defendant and Detective Moosman greeted each other, Defendant 
began to tell the detective about his recent travails, primarily a fight with his mother 
and an accusation by his stepmother that he had taken some of her prescription 
drugs. R. 126:13:36:12-37:46. 
Detective Moosman then told Defendant that they were there to talk about 
Mr. Ruzicka's death again. R. 126:13:37:46. Detective Moosman explained that, 
because Defendant had just been arrested, Detective Moosman had to "go through" 
Defendant's rights with him. R. 126:13:38:02. 
Detective Moosman took out an Admonition of Rights Form and put it in 
front of Defendant. R. 126:13:38:04. The Form stated: 
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Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your 
rights. Those rights are: 
You have the right to remain silent. 
If you give up the right to remain silent, anything you say 
can and will be used against you in a court of law. 
You have the right to speak with an attorney and to have 
the attorney present during questioning. 
If you so desire and cannot afford one, an attorney will be 
appointed for you without charge before questioning. 
If you decide to answer questions now without a 
lawyer/attorney present, you will still have the right to stop 
answering questions at any time. You also have the right to stop 
answering at any time until you have talked to a 
lawyer/ attorney. 
WAIVER OF RIGHTS 
I have been "warned" regarding my rights and have read the 
above statement regarding my rights. I understand what my 
rights are. I am willing to make a statement and answer 
questions. I do not want a lawyer at this time. I understand and 
know what I am doing. No promises or threats have been made 
to me and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used 
against me. 
R. 128 (attached at Addendum C). 
Detective Moosman began to read from the Admonition of Rights Form that 
Defendant had the right to remain silent. R. 126:13:38:07. Detective Moosman asked 
Defendant whether he understood that right, and Defendant responded, "yeah." R. 
5 
126:13:38:09. Detective Moosman asked Defendant if he would initial the Form 
beside that right. R. 126:13:38:12. 
Then, looking back over his shoulder, Defendant said, "I can just read it, he 
just read me my rights." R. 126:13:38:12. Detective Moosman said that was fine and 
asked Defendant "if you'll read and just initial by them." R. 126:13:38:14-38:20. 
Over the next two minutes, Defendant looked at the Form and moved his pen 
from left to right across the page, stopping periodically to place his initials on the 
page. R. 126:13:38:12-13:39:04. As he did so, Defendant continued to talk with 
Detective Moosman about extraneous matters. Id. At times, Defendant would look 
at Detective Moosman while he talked, and then return to the Form. Id. 
After Defendant placed his initials beside each right on the Form, Detective 
Moosman asked Defendant to read the next section and initial it. R. 126:13:39:05. As 
Defendant continued to talk about other matters, he looked down at the 
Admonition of Rights Form and again moved his pen back and forth across the 
page. When Defendant finished reading, Detective Moosman told Defendant where 
to initial and then, after Defendant had moved his pen through the next section, 
Detective Moosman told Defendant where to sign. R. 126:13:39:05-13:40:15. 
Detective Moosman asked Defendant whether he understood "all this stuff"; 
Defendant responded, "yup." R. 126:13:40:15. 
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Detective Moosman told Defendant that, if he understood and agreed with it, 
he should sign the form at the bottom "and then I'll sign as a witness/' R. 
126:13:40:16-40:23. After Defendant signed the form, the detective also signed it. R. 
126:13:40:23-40:42. 
Defendant showed no reservation about talking with Detective Moosman 
concerning what happened on the night Mr. Ruzicka died. R. 126:13:40:48. 
Defendant admitted that he and Mr. Ruzicka had both bought drugs that night. He 
admitted that he had several balloons of heroine on him that night and that he was 
selling it at the time. He admitted that he sold Mr. Ruzicka a balloon of heroine on 
the day Mr. Ruzicka died. He admitted that he and Mr. Ruzicka used drugs that 
night. He admitted that he had paraphernalia with him that night. And he 
admitted that he had moved a bong out of Mr. Ruzicka's room into another room 
before emergency personnel arrived. R. 126:13:41:14-14:01:03. 
Detective Moosman then asked Defendant to give him a written statement. R. 
126:14:02:50. Detective Moosman provided Defendant with a form and began by 
asking Defendant to fill in his name, address and telephone number at the top of the 
form. R. 126:14:02:50-14:04:00. Defendant continued to talk with Detective 
Moosman as he completed the top of the form. R. 126:14:04:00-14:07:48. Detective 
Moosman then asked Defendant to read the next paragraph—which warned that his 
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statement could be used in lieu of his testimony — out loud. R. 126:14:07:38-07:42. 
Defendant read the paragraph out loud without a problem. R. 126:14:07:44-08:06. 
Defendant spent about 45 minutes completing his written statement, reading 
it aloud as he went. R. 126:14:10:31-14:56:35. The interview lasted slightly more 
than 80 minutes. R. 126. 
Based on his interview with Detective Moosman, Defendant was charged 
with one count each of distribution of a controlled substance, a first degree felony; 
possession of a controlled substance, a second degree felony; possession of drug 
paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class B misdemeanor; amd obstruction of justice, 
a class A misdemeanor. R. 2-1. Following a preliminary hearing, Defendant was 
bound over on all counts. R. 31-30. 
Defendant then filed a motion to suppress the statements he made during his 
interview with Detective Moosman, asserting that the detective had failed to 
adequately advise him of his Miranda rights. R. 39-37. At the evidentiary hearing 
that followed, the trial court received both a copy of Defendant's interview with 
Detective Moosman and a copy of the Admonition of Rights Form Defendant 
completed before that interview. R. 113:6-15 (transcript attached at Addendum D). 
The Admonition of Rights Form showed that Defendant had initialed beside each 
paragraph identifying his Miranda rights and beside the paragraph addressing his 
8 
waiver of those rights. R. 128. The Form also included Defendant's signature under 
the waiver paragraph. Id. 
Detective Moosman was the only witness called at the hearing. R. 113:6-15. 
The State presented no evidence concerning the initial Miranda warnings Defendant 
received from the arresting officers just prior to his interview with Detective 
Moosman. Id. At the close of evidence, the court set the matter for argument. 
At the next hearing, the parties first addressed Defendant's sentencing in 
three other pending cases and, in the process, acknowledged that Defendant had a 
prior felony conviction. R. 121:4-9 (transcript attached at Addendum E). The court 
then heard argument on Defendant's motion to suppress. R. 121:9. 
At the close of argument, the trial court orally granted Defendant's motion. R. 
76; R. 121:24. In its written order, the trial court found it was "unable to determine. 
.. in what sequence Defendant initialed the various places where his initials appear 
on the form, or whether Defendant actually read the various admonitions on the 
form, much less whether Defendant comprehended any of the admonitions.,, R. 82 
(attached at Addendum F). The court then found that that "Defendant did not focus 
exclusively on the admonitions written on the" Admonition of Rights Form and that 
"Defendant was distracted from the admonitions on the form by the matters about 
which he spoke with Det. Moosman." Id. Consequently, the court concluded that it 
was "not persuaded... that Defendant, by his own reading of the written waiver of 
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rights form, was adequately advised" of his Miranda righs. R. 81. Moreover, 
because the court could not "determine from the evidence [whether]... Defendant 
was in fact previously advised of his Miranda rights, who so advised him, whether 
such admonitions were adequately recited to Defendant... or whether Defendant 
voluntarily and knowingly waived [them]," the court concluded that it was "not 
persuaded . . . that prior to the interview by Detective Moosman, Defendant had 
been adequately advised of his Miranda rights [or] that Defendant voluntarily and 
knowingly waived each of such rights." Id. 
Two days after the court issued its oral ruling, the State filed a Motion for 
Rehearing on Suppression Motion, asking the trial court to reopen the evidentiary 
hearing to permit the State to "present evidence from the Lehi police officers who 
read the Defendant his Miranda rights" just minutes prior to Detective Moosman's 
review of those rights with Defendant. R. 70-69. Defendant objected to the State's 
motion. R. 73-71. 
At a hearing that followed, the trial court opined that the State's motion 
constituted an attempt to get "a second bite at the apple." R. 122:4 (transcript 
attached at Addendum G). The court then ruled that, because neither the rules of 
criminal procedure nor the rules of civil procedure specifically provide for motions 
for rehearing, rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure was "[t]he most 
closely appropriate rule . . . that would govern the State's [m]otion." R. 88-86 
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(attached at Addendum H). And the court ruled that under rule 24, a party seeking 
a new trial based on additional evidence must show that the new evidence "'could 
not with reasonable diligence have been discovered and produced at the trial.'" Id. 
(quoting State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991)). The court then denied the 
State's motion, ruling that the evidence the State sought to admit did not qualify as 
newly discovered evidence. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. The trial court erred in granting Defendant's motion to suppress his 
interview with Detective Moosman. According to the trial court, because Defendant 
was distracted when he completed the Admonition of Rights Form, the evidence 
was insufficient to establish that his completion of the Form adequately advised him 
of his Miranda rights. Thus, according to the court, the record did not support the 
conclusion that Defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. 
Whether a defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights is valid "has two distinct 
dimensions." First, the waiver must be voluntary "in the sense that it was the 
product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or 
deception." Second, the waiver must be knowing and intelligent, i.e., made "with a 
full awareness both of the nature of the right[s] being abandoned and the 
consequences of the decision to abandon [them]." So long as "the 'totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the interrogation' reveal both an uncoerced choice and 
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the requisite level of comprehension/' a defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights is 
valid. Thus, the defendant need not be in an "optimal mental state" when the 
warnings are given. Rather, he need only be "able to understand his important, yet 
relatively simple Miranda rights." 
In this case, the trial court concluded that, because Defendant continued to 
talk with Detective Moosman about extraneous issues while he completed the 
Admonition of Rights Form, the record did not establish that Defendant understood 
the rights he was reading. In reaching that conclusion, however, the trial court failed 
to properly consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding Defendant's 
completion of the Form. Although that totality of circumstances does include 
Defendant's being distracted while he was completing the Admonition of Rights 
Form, it also includes Defendant's extensive prior experience with the criminal 
justice system, his intelligence and ability to read, his attentiveness to the 
Admonition of Rights Form as he completed it, his appearing to have read the Form 
as he completed it, and his confirmation to Detective Moosman afterwards that he 
understood his rights. This totality of circumstances contradicts the trial court's 
conclusion that Defendant's completion of the Admonition of Rights Form was 
inadequate to inform him of "his important, yet relatively simple Miranda rights." 
Point II. The trial court erred when it applied the newly discovered evidence 
standard applicable to new trials to the State's motion to reopen the suppression 
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hearing. Under the appropriate standard, the trial court should have granted the 
State's motion, where the missing evidence was crucial to deciding whether 
Defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was valid and nothing in the record 
suggested that the State had purposefully withheld the evidence from the first 
hearing. 
Point II. A. The trial court committed plain error when it ruled that the 
newly discovered evidence standard governing motions for new trial under rule 24 
also governs pretrial motions to reopen suppression hearings. First, the court erred 
in applying rule 24 to the State's motion because, by its terms, rule 24 applies to 
post-judgment motions for new trial. This was a pretrial motion to reopen a 
suppression hearing. Second, the court's error should have been obvious because 
Utah case law has consistently granted trial courts broad discretion to grant pre-
judgment motions to reopen evidentiary hearings. Utah law contains no 
requirement that this type of motion be based on newly discovered evidence. It 
was, therefore, obvious error to impose such a requirement here. Finally, the court's 
error was prejudicial because the court's denial of the State's motion to reopen 
precluded the State from pursuing serious criminal charges against Defendant 
despite a constitutionally-obtained confession. 
Point ILB. Under the proper standard, the trial court should have 
granted the State's motion to reopen. This Court has consistently held that a trial 
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court has broad discretion when deciding whether to reopen evidentiary matters 
before final judgment. This Court has also held that a court's discretion to reopen 
evidentiary hearings should "be liberally exercised in behalf of allowing the whole 
case to be presented" and "prevent[ing] a miscarriage of justice/7 It should not be 
exercised "in a capricious and arbitrary manner which produces an inequitable or 
unjust result, 
In this case, the trial court's grant of Defendant's suppression motion 
precluded the State from pursuing serious criminal charges against him. Yet, the 
State had crucial evidence to challenge the trial court's ruling, and nothing in the 
record suggests that the State purposefully withheld that evidence at the initial 
suppression hearing. 
On the other side of the balance, the costs of reopening the suppression 
hearing would have been slight. Nothing in the record suggests that reopening the 
suppression hearing would have unduly prejudiced Defendant or interfered with 
the trial court's resources or docket. 
Under such circumstances, the trial court should have granted the State's 
timely pretrial motion to reopen to "allow[] the whole case to be presented" and to 
avoid the "inequitable and unjust result" of precluding the State from prosecuting 
Defendant for serious crimes despite a constitutionally-obtained confession. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
WHERE DEFENDANT WAS EXPERIENCED WITH THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, VOLUNTEERED TO READ HIS 
MIRANDA RIGHTS HIMSELF FROM THE ADMONITION OF 
RIGHTS FORM, COMPLETED THE FORM, AND THEN 
CONFIRMED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD HIS RIGHTS, THE 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT DEFENDANT WAS 
NOT ADEQUATELY ADVISED OF HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS 
MERELY BECAUSE HE TALKED ABOUT EXTRANEOUS 
ISSUES WHILE HE COMPLETED THE FORM 
The trial court erred in granting Defendant's suppression motion based on its 
conclusion that Defendant was not adequately advised of his Miranda rights before 
his interview with Detective Moosman. First, the court's finding that it was "unable 
to determine . . . whether Defendant actually read the various admonitions on the 
form, much less whether Defendant comprehended any of the admonitions" is 
contrary to the clear weight of the evidence. Second, the totality of the 
circumstances—including Defendant's prior experience with the criminal justice 
system, his intelligence and ability to read, his completion of a Notice of Rights 
Form, and his acknowledgment to Detective Moosman that he understood his 
rights — do not support the trial court's conclusion. Thus, the trial court's ruling on 
Defendant's suppression motion should be reversed. 
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A. Governing law. 
"The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that no 
person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.'" 
Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 572 (1987). To protect that right, before any 
custodial interrogation, "the [defendant] must be warned that he has a right to 
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against 
him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or 
appointed." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,444 (1966). 
"There is," however, "no requirement as to the precise manner in which 
police communicate [these Miranda] warnings to one suspected of crime.'" United 
States v. Osterburg, 423 F.2d 704,705 (9th Cir. 1970) (quoting Bell v. United States, 382 
F.2d 985,987 (9th Cir. 1967)); see also United States v. Alexander, 441 F.2d 403,404 (3rd 
Cir. 1971) (per curiam); State v. Fisher, 556 A.2d 596,598 (Conn. 1989); State v. Strobel, 
596 S.E.2d 249,253 (N.C. App. 2004). 
Consequently, "it is not essential that the warnings required by Miranda . . . 
be given in oral rather than written form." United States v. Sledge, 546 F.2d 1120, 
1122 (4th Cir. 1977); see also United States v. Coleman, 524 F.2d 593, 594 (10th Cir. 
1975) (per curiam); United States v. Bailey, 468 F.2d 652, 659-60 (5th Cir. 1972); 
Alexander, 441 F.2d at 404; United States v. Van Dusen, 431 F.2d 1278,1280 (1st Cir. 
1970); United States v. Johnson, 426 F.2d 1112,1115 (7th Cir. 1970); Osterburg, 423 F.2d 
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at 705; Fisher, 556 A.2d at 598; State v. Roman, 983 So.2d 731,737 (Fla. App. Ct. 2008); 
Commonwealth v. Day, 444 N.E.2d 384,386 n.8 (Mass. 1983); Strobel, 596 S.E.2d at 253; 
State v. Apleton, 459 A.2d 94, 96 (R.I. 1983). 
Once warnings are given, a defendant may waive his Miranda rights, 
"provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." Miranda, 
384 U.S. at 444. A waiver is voluntary if "it was the product of a free and deliberate 
choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception." Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 
412, 421 (1986). A waiver is knowing and intelligent if it was "made with a full 
awareness of both the nature of the right[s] being abandoned and the consequences 
of the decision to abandon [them]." Id. "[I]f the 'totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the interrogation' reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite 
level of comprehension," a court may properly conclude that the waiver is valid. 
"An express written or oral statement of waiver... is usually strong proof of 
the validity of that waiver." North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369,373 (1979). "[A] 
waiver of a suspect's rights 'may [also] be inferred from his acknowledgment of his 
understanding of his rights and his subsequent course of conduct.'" State v. Leyva, 
951 P.2d 738, 744 (Utah 1997) (quoting State v. Hegelman, 717 P.2d 1348,1349 (Utah 
1986)); accord Butler, 441 U.S. at 373; State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 940 (Utah 1994). 
Thus, courts "look at the totality of the circumstances to determine if a suspect 
has a made a valid waiver.'" Leyva, 951 P.2d at 744 (quoting Hegelman, 717 P.2d at 
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1349); accord State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221, 224 (Utah 1989). Such circumstances 
include '"the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case, including the 
background, experience, and conduct of the accused." State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 
236 (Utah 1985) (quoting Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039,1046 (1983)). 
Relevant circumstances, therefore, include the defendant's "intelligence and 
education, age and familiarity with the criminal justice system, [and] the proximity 
of the waiver to the giving of the Miranda warnings." Correll v. Tliompson, 63 F.3d 
1279,1288 (4th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted); see also State v. Dutchie, 969 P.2d 422,427 
(Utah 1998). 
Relevant circumstances also include the defendant's "ability to comprehend 
the meaning and effect of his statement," as well as "questions of duress, threats, 
promises or other coercion." Dutchie, 969 P.2d at 427. In assessing a defendant's 
"ability to comprehend the meaning and effect of his statement," id., however, the 
defendant need not be "completely mentally healthy at the time of the interview" or 
be "thinking as clearly as he could have been." State v. Bybee, 2000 UT 43, f 27,1 
P.3d 1087. The inquiry "is not whether [the defendant] was in an optimal mental 
state, but whether he was able to understand his important, yet relatively simple 
Miranda rights." Id. 
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B. Defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda 
rights. 
In this case, "the record is devoid of any suggestion that police resorted to 
physical or psychological pressure to elicit [Defendant's] statements," Burbine, 475 
U.S. at 422. Thus, "[t]he voluntariness of [Defendant's] waiver is not at issue." Id. 
Rather, the only question is whether the trial court properly concluded Defendant 
was not sufficiently advised of his Miranda rights to render his waiver knowing and 
intelligent. It did not. 
First, Defendant had extensive prior experience with the criminal justice 
system before he received his Miranda warnings from Detective Moosman. While 
Defendant's motion to suppress was pending in this case, the same trial court had 
before it at least three other criminal cases involving Defendant. See R. 121:3-6. In 
addition, Defendant had a prior conviction in 2002 to a second degree felony drug 
offense. R. 127:28, 29; R. 121:3-6. 
Second, Defendant's interactions with Detective Moosman before he was 
given his rights reveals that Defendant was an intelligent and articulate man able to 
both understand and respond appropriately to questions asked of him. R. 
126:passim. 
Third, Defendant's offer to read his Miranda rights from the Admonition of 
Rights Form rather than have them read to him indicates that Defendant had the 
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ability to read. And Defendant's ability was confirmed later in the interview when 
Detective Moosman asked him to read a paragraph from another form out loud and 
when, as Defendant completed his written statement, he read it aloud as he wrote. 
R. 126:14:07:48; R. 126:14:10:00-31:00. 
Finally, and most importantly, Defendant completed the Admonition of 
Rights Form, which set forth Defendant's Miranda rights. R. 128. And the record 
reveals that, although Defendant talked with Detective Moosman about extraneous 
things while reviewing the Form, he was attentive to the Form as he completed it. 
In addition, the record reveals that Defendant did not merely initial the Form 
blindly. To the contrary, Defendant could be seen dragging his pen back and forth 
across each of the paragraphs on the Form-as one would do if he were reading it-
before initialing them. R. I26:passim. Moreover, after Defendant had initialed by his 
rights, Detective Moosman asked Defendant, "Do you understand all this stuff?" R. 
126:13:40:15. Defendant responded, "Yup." R. 126:13:40:15. And, lastly, when 
Detective Moosman then asked Defendant that, if he "understand[s] and agree[s] 
with it, sign right there and then Til sign as a witness/' Defendant completed the 
waiver portion of the Form with his signature and then showed no hesitation in 
talking with Detective Moosman about Mr. Ruzicka's death. R. 126:13:40:16-40:26. 
This totality of circumstances does not support the trial court's conclusion 
that Defendant was not adequately advised of his Miranda rights. To reach that 
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conclusion on this evidence, the trial court had to not only ignore Defendant's prior 
experience with the criminal justice system, but also find that Defendant was 
pretending to read the Admonition of Rights Form when he really was not and find 
that Defendant was lying when he told Detective Moosman that he understood "all 
this stuff/7 The requirement that the court consider the totality of the circumstances, 
however, does not permit the court to ignore Defendant's prior experience with the 
criminal justice system. And nothing in the record —other than the fact that 
Defendant talked with Detective Moosman when he completed the Admonition of 
Rights Form—supports findings that Defendant was only pretending to read the 
Form as he dragged his pen back and forth across the page or that Defendant was 
lying when he told the detective he understood the information on the Form. 
In sum, "[w]hen someone with . . . extensive experience with the criminal 
justice system... demonstrates an ability to read, and appears to read his Miranda 
rights, those circumstances constitute 'strong proof that the waiver and the 
subsequent statement were voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently given/' Fisher, 
556 A.2d at 599 (citation omitted). Similarly," [a]n express written or oral statement 
of waiver... is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver/7 Butler, 441 U.S. 
at 373. And, finally, a waiver "'may [also] be inferred from [a defendant's] 
acknowledgement of his understanding of his rights and his subsequent course of 
conduct." Leyva, 951 P.2d at 744 (citation omitted). 
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In this case, Defendant had extensive experience with the criminal justice 
system prior to his interview with Detective Moosman. In addition, he both 
demonstrated an ability to read and appeared to have read his Miranda rights prior 
to the interview. He then indicated to Detective Moosman that he understood those 
rights, completed an express written waiver of those rights, and revealed no 
hesitation in talking with Detective Moosman about Mr. Ruzicka's death. 
This totality of the circumstances supports the conclusion that Defendant was 
adequately advised of his Miranda rights before he waived them. Thus, the trial 
court erred when it granted Defendant's suppression motion based on its conclusion 
that Defendant was not adequately advised of those rights. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE STATE'S 
TIMELY PRETRIAL MOTION TO REOPEN THE SUPPRESSION 
HEARING, WHERE THE STATE OMITTED BUT DID NOT 
PURPOSEFULLY WITHHOLD, CRUCIAL EVIDENCE AT THE 
INITIAL HEARING 
The trial court committed plain error when it applied the standard governing 
post-judgment motions for new trial under rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, to the State's timely pretrial motion to briefly reopen the suppression 
hearing. Under the appropriate standard, the trial court should have granted the 
State's motion. 
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A. The trial court committed plain error in ruling that rule 24, which 
governs post-judgment motions for new trial, governed the State's 
timely pretrial motion to briefly reopen the suppression hearing. 
Before the trial court, the State did not challenge the court's ruling that rule 
24, of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, governed the State's timely pretrial 
motion to reopen the suppression hearing. R. 122:5. Thus, to prevail on appeal, the 
State must demonstrate that the trial court committed plain error when it ruled that 
rule 24 governed the State's motion. 
'To demonstrate plain error, [the appellant] must establish that (i) an error 
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant/' State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, Tf 15,95 P.3d 276 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
In this case, the trial court erred in applying the newly discovered evidence 
standard under rule 24 to the State's motion because, by its terms, rule 24 applies 
only to post-judgment motions for new trial filed, not to pretrial motions to reopen 
evidentiary hearings filed before trial. Second, the court's error should have been 
obvious because Utah courts have consistently held that trial courts have broad 
discretion to reopen pre-judgment evidentiary hearings, regardless of whether the 
evidence sought to be presented is newly discovered. Finally, the court's error was 
prejudicial because its failure to reopen the evidentiary hearing precluded the State 
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from pursuing serious criminal charges against Defendant despite an admissible 
confession. 
Error. The trial court erred in ruling that Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, governs timely pretrial motions to reopen suppression hearings. 
Rule 24 governs post-judgment motions for new trial. Under the rule, a trial 
court "may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant a new trial in 
the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial 
adverse effect upon the rights of a party/7 Utah R. Crim. P. 24(a). Under the rule, a 
court may grant a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence only if 
the evidence (1) is '"such as could not with reasonable diligence have been 
discovered and produced at the trial'"; (2) is '"not... merely cumulative"'; and (3) is 
'"such as to render a different result probable on the retrial of the case.'" State v. 
Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ^ 11,84 P.3d 1183 (citation omitted). Finally, under the rule, a 
motion for new trial may not be filed prior to entry of a final judgment of 
conviction, but, rather, must be filed "not later than 10 days after entry of the 
sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix before the expiration of 
the time for filing a motion for new trial." Utah R. Crim. P. 24(c) (emphasis added). 
The State's timely pretrial motion to reopen a suppression hearing was not a 
motion for new trial. It was not filed after a final judgment of conviction had been 
entered. See Utah R. Crim. P. 24(c). And it was not filed to upset any final judgment 
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of conviction. See Utah R. Crim. P. 24(c). Rather, the State's timely motion to reopen 
a suppression hearing was a pretrial motion to reopen the evidence on Defendant's 
suppression motion. By its own terms, therefore, rule 24 did not apply to the State's 
motion. 
Obvious error. The trial court's error in applying rule 24 to the State's timely 
pretrial motion to reopen the suppression hearing should have been obvious 
because the principles governing motions to reopen evidentiary hearings made 
before final judgment are well-established under Utah case law. 
Under that case law, a trial court has broad discretion to reopen evidentiary 
hearings, regardless of whether the evidence sought to be presented is newly 
discovered. See Gardner v. Christensen, 622 P.2d 782,784 (Utah 1980); Ross v. Leftwich, 
14 Utah 2d 71,377 P.2d 495,497 (1963); State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323,234 P.2d 600, 
601 (1951); State v. Duncan, 102 Utah 449, 132 P.2d 121, 125 (1942); Wasatch Oil 
Refining Co. v. Wade, 92 Utah 50,63 P.2d 1070,1075 (1936); State v. Seel, 827 P.2d 954, 
962 (Utah App. 1992). 
Moreover, under that case law, a trial court's discretion should "be liberally 
exercised in behalf of allowing the whole case to be presented." Wasatch Oil Refining 
Co., 63 P.2d at 1075. It should not "be exercised in a capricious and arbitrary 
manner which produces an inequitable or unjust result." Gardner, 622 P.2d at 784; 
see also Ross, 377 P.2d at 497 (holding trial court abused its discretion in denying 
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motion to reopen civil case where "motion was timely made" and "defendants 
would not be placed at a disadvantage"); Lawrence, 234 P.2d at 601 (suggesting that, 
where defendant moved for dismissal for insufficient evidence at close of evidence, 
"State's attorney might properly and with little difficulty have moved to reopen and 
supply the missing evidence"); Duncan, 132 P.2d at 125 (holding trial court has 
discretion to reopen case to "prevent a miscarriage of justice"); Seel, 827 P.2d at 962 
(rejecting claim that trial court committed plain error in allowing State to reopen 
evidence during jury trial even though missing evidence was apparently available at 
time evidence initially closed); cf. State v. Willard, 801 P.2d 189,191 (Utah App. 1990) 
(citing approvingly of case law from other jurisdictions holding that trial courts 
have discretion to reconsider pre-trial rulings on motions to suppress). 
Prejudice. Finally, the State was prejudiced by the trial court's obvious error 
in applying rule 24 to its motion to reopen the suppression hearing. The trial court's 
refusal to reopen the suppression hearing because the State's evidence was not 
newly discovered left the State without the ability to use Defendant's confession at 
trial. Absent that confession, the State lacked sufficient evidence to pursue its 
charges against Defendant. R. 99-98 (State moving to dismiss because trial court's 
"suppression ruling has substantially impaired the State's case against the 
Defendant"). 
* * * * * 
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In sum, the trial court committed obvious and prejudicial error when it ruled 
that the newly discovered evidence standard applicable to post-judgment motions 
for new trial under rule 24 also applies to timely pretrial motions to reopen 
suppression hearings. Thus, this Court should reverse the trial court's ruling. 
B. Under the proper abuse of discretion standard, the trial court 
should have granted the State's timely pretrial motion to reopen 
the suppression hearing, where the State omitted, but did not 
purposefully withhold, crucial evidence from the initial hearing. 
Under the proper abuse of discretion standard, the trial court should have 
granted the State's timely pretrial motion to reopen the suppression hearing. 
As stated, this Court has recognized that a trial court has broad discretion in 
deciding whether to reopen evidentiary matters before a final judgment is entered. 
See, e.g., Ross, 377 P.2d at 497; Lawrence, 234 P.2d at 601; Duncan, 132 P.2d at 125; 
Wasatch Oil, 63 P.2d at 1075. 
As this Court has also recognized, however, a trial court's discretion should 
"be liberally exercised in behalf of allowing the whole case to be presented." 
Wasatch Oil Refining Co., 63 P.2d at 1075. It should "not be exercised in a capricious 
and arbitrary manner which produces an inequitable or unjust result," Gardner, 622 
P.2d at 784. 
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These principles are particularly important when the motion at issue seeks to 
reopen a suppression hearing. First, admissions of guilt resulting from valid 
Miranda waivers "'are more than merely "desirable"; they are essential to society's 
compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the 
law/" Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162,172 (2001) (citations omitted). 
Second, a wrongly decided suppression motion could "cost the State its 
opportunity to pursue a serious criminal charge." State v. James, 635 P.2d 1102,1104 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (reversing denial of State's motion to continue suppression 
hearing where "denial of a continuance cost the State its opportunity to pursue a 
serious criminal charge"). Yet, there exists a "strong public interest in adjudicating 
[criminal] cases on the merits." United States v. Roberts, 978 F.2d 17,22 (1st Cir. 1992) 
(reviewing ruling on motion to reopen under "interest of justice" standard). 
Finally, "[t]he justice system is not a sporting event in which each side has a 
right to exploit every tactical advantage available." Medel v. State, 2008 UT 32, ^ 54, 
184 P.3d 1226. Nor is it "a sporting event in which the rules of the game trump the 
search for truth." State v. Perkins, 856 A.2d 917, 937 (Conn. 2004). Rather, "[a] 
primary purpose of [the justice system] is the vindication of the laws of a civilized 
society against those who are guilty of transgressing those laws." State v. Howell, 
649 P.2d 91,94 (Utah 1982). 
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Each of these interests should inform the trial court's discretion when ruling 
on pretrial motions to reopen suppression hearings. And, in light of these interests, 
"vague notions of unfairness, that the government should not have 'two bites' off 
the same apple, ought not control" whether to grant a motion to reopen a 
suppression hearing. United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 132 (2nd Cir. 2000) 
(citation omitted). Rather, "it is 'better practice for the court to reconsider a pretrial 
[suppression] ruling 'where serious grounds arise as to the correctness of the 
[original] ruling.'" State v. Simoneau, 833 A.2d 1280, 1291 (Vt. 2003) (citations 
omitted). 
Consequently," [i]f the government possesses evidence showing that, in fact, 
no official misconduct occurred [in obtaining a defendant's statement], the interests 
of justice militate strongly in favor of considering this evidence even if it is belatedly 
brought to the district court's attention." In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in 
East Africa, 552 F.3d 177,197 (2nd Cir. 2008); see also Regilio, 669 F.2d at 1177 ("If 
matters appearing later indicate that no constitutional violation occurred, society's 
interest in admitting all relevant evidence militates strongly in favor of permitting 
reconsideration."); cf. State v. Ellis, 491 So.2d 1296,1296-97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); 
State v. Moore, lib S.W.2d 372,375 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989). 
As a result, a majority of jurisdictions considering the issue have rejected the 
notion that motions to reopen suppression hearings must be based on newly 
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discovered evidence. See, e.g., Ark. R. Crim. P. 16.2(c); State v. Harvey, 573 So.2d 111, 
113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Martin v. State, 411 S.E.2d 910,912 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991); 
People v. Wagner, 427 N.E.2d 985, 986 (111. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Doughty, 472 
N.W.2d 299,302 n.2 (Minn. 1991); State v. Pilot, 2004 WL1551517 (Nos. CA2003-03-
023, CA2003-03-24) (Ohio App. July 12,2004); Commonwealth v. Branch, 437 A.2d 748, 
750-51 (Pa. 1981); State v. Moore, 775 S.W.3d 372, 375 (Term. Crim. App. 1989); 
Montalvo v. State, 846 S.W.2d 133,137-38 (Tex. App. 1993); Thompson v. Steptoe, 366 
S.E.2d 647, 650 (W.Va. 1988); United States v. Brown, 449 F.3d 741 (6th Cir. 2006); 
United States v. Kithcart, 218 F.3d 213,220 (3rd Cir. 2000); United States v. Dickerson, 
166 F.3d 667, 679 & n i l (4* Cir. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); 
United States v. Villabona-Garnica, 63 F.3d 1051,1055 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Greely, 425 F.2d 592,593 (5th Cir. 1970); McRae v. United States, 420 F.2d 1283,1286-
89 (D.C. Cir. 1969); but see State v. Landry, 339 So.2d 8 (La. 1976); Md. Rule 4-
252(h)(2). 
Rather, courts have identified a broad spectrum of factors that should inform 
a trial court's discretion when ruling on a motion to reopen a suppression hearing. 
These factors, which acknowledge both society's interest in prosecuting serious 
crimes and a trial court's need to control the proceedings before it, include: 
the nature of the case, Roberts, 978 F.2d at 22; 
the experience of the prosecutor, James, 635 P.2d at 1104; 
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the timeliness of the motion, Roberts, 978 F.2d at 22; 
the reason for not presenting the evidence at the first hearing, 
including whether the defendant's motion adequately raised the 
issue, James, 635 P.2d at 1104; and whether "the State deliberately 
withheld the evidence" at the first hearing, Stewart, 827 A.2d at 
874, or the evidence was "inadvertently omitted by the 
prosecution," Branch, 437 A.2d at 751; Thompson, 366 S.E.2d at 
650; Roberts, 978 F.2d at 23; Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 679; Rabb, 752 
F.2datl323. 
whether the evidence "would have impacted upon the decision 
of the trial court and was crucial to the state's argument," Ellis, 
491 So.2d at 1296; Roberts, 978 F.2d at 24; Rabb, 752 F.2d at 1323; 
Regilio, 669 F.2d at 1177; 
whether reopening the hearing will "impair[] the ability of the 
defendant to answer and otherwise receive a fair trial," Stewart, 
827 A.2d at 873; Roberts, 978 F.2d at 23; Rabb, 752 F.2d at 1323; 
and, 
the impact of reopening on a trial court's resources or docket, 
Roberts, 978 F.2d at 23; Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 679. 
None of these factors mandate that a trial court grant a motion to reopen in 
every case. However, they do support a liberal exercise of discretion in favor of 
reopening hearings in the pretrial suppression motion context. 
And these factors weigh heavily in favor of briefly reopening the suppression 
hearing in this case. First, this case involves a first degree felony drug charge as 
well as numerous other serious charges, and the trial court's initial ruling on 
Defendant's suppression motion affected the State's ability to pursue those charges. 
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Second, Defendant's original motion focused on the sufficiency of the second 
Miranda warning. R. 39-37; 65-55. Consequently, the prosecutor focused on that 
issue during the first suppression hearing. R. H3:passim. There is no evidence that 
the prosecutor deliberately withheld evidence concerning the first Miranda warning. 
Third, in its oral ruling on Defendant's motion, the trial court noted the 
absence of evidence concerning Defendant's first Miranda warning and indicated 
that such evidence may have altered its decision. In light of the trial court's ruling, 
evidence concerning Defendant's first Miranda warnings became crucial to the 
prosecutor's argument 
Fourth, although the prosecutor did not orally move to reopen the 
suppression hearing as soon as the trial court noted that evidence concerning the 
first Miranda warning was relevant, the prosecutor filed a written motion to reopen 
within two days of the trial court's oral ruling. 
Fifth, nothing in the record suggests that reopening the hearing at that point 
would have impaired Defendant's ability to respond to the evidence or to otherwise 
receive a fair trial. 
Finally, nothing in the record suggests that reopening the hearing at that point 
would have unduly interfered with the trial court's resources or docket. 
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Given the multitude of factors weighing in favor of granting the State's 
motion to briefly reopen the suppression hearing, the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying the State's motion. 
CONCLUSION 
The totality of the circumstances does not support the trial court's conclusion 
that Defendant was not sufficiently advised of his Miranda rights to render his 
waiver knowing and intelligent. Thus, trial court erred in granting Defendant's 
motion to suppress his confession. 
Alternatively, the trial court committed plain error when it applied the newly 
discovered evidence standard governing motions for new trial to the State's timely 
pretrial motion to reopen the suppression hearing. Under the proper standard, the 
court should have granted the State's motion. Thus, this Court should remand this 
matter to the trial court with an order to reopen the suppression hearing. 
Respectfully submitted July 1, 2009. 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
United States Constitution, Amendment V 
Amendment V. Grand jury indictment for capital crimes; double jeopardy; 
self-incrimination; due process of law; just compensation for property 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of 
War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 24 
RULE 24. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant a 
new trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which had 
a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party. 
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The 
motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in 
support of the motion. If additional time is required to procure affidavits or 
evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it 
deems reasonable. 
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made not later than 10 days after entry 
of the sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix before 
expiration of the time for filing a motion for new trial. 
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no 
trial had been held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned either 
in evidence or in argument. 
Addendum B 
Addendum C 
ALPINE/HIGHLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT 
Admonition of Rights 
\i\:Ho «=* DATE TIME 
PLACE 
Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights- Those rights are: 
You have the right to remain silent. 
If you give up the right to remain silent, anything you say can and will be used against 
you in a court of law. 
You have the right to speak with an attorney and to have the attorney present during 
questioning. 
]4jj If you so desire and cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed for you without 
charge before questioning. 
If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer/attorney present, you will still have the right to stop 
answering questions at any time. You also have the right to stop answering at any time until you have talked 
to a lawyer/attorney. 
WAIVER OF RIGHTS 
I have been "warned" regarding my rights and have read the above statement regarding my rights. I 
understand what my rights are. I am willing to make a statement and answer questions. I do not want 
a lawyer at this time. I understand and know what I am doing. No promises or threats have been 
made to me and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me. 
Date MAY I ZOO? 
Time )*N/£ 
Signature 
Witness 
Officer Administrating Rigl 
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first? 
minute 
THE 
MR. 
MR. 
•? 
MR. 
Mr. Bozung. 
here. 
with a 
versus 
by Mr. 
doing 1 
just -
THE 
MR. 
THE 
All 
COURT: 
JOHNSON 
MEANS: 
JOHNSON 
COURT: 
JOHNSON 
COURT: 
right. 
court reporter 
Gareth 
Means, 
And 
Bozung \ 
and Mr. 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
All right. Which case should we tackle 
: Mr. Bozung's. 
Who is going to be out here in just a 1 
: Transport took everyone down except 1 
And he's locked away. 1 
Yeah, apparently in the holding cell 
No one gives us a key to that door. 1 
We'll go to our file number, and we're on 
, 071402713. This is the State of Utah 
tfho is here and in custody and represented J 
Johnson is here for the State. 1 
evidently the parties have a different way of 
Lhis than an evidentiary hearing; isn't that right? I 
MR. 
THE 
MEANS: 
COURT: 
preliminary hearing? 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
MEANS: 
COURT: 
MEANS: 
Well, you decide, your Honor, I'll 1 
Have you got a transcript there for the 
I do. 
Oh, we don't yet. J 
Let me make sure that's what it is. 1 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
Yep, October 10. All right. In brief, my argument 
for suppression is the adequacy of Miranda warning given on 
May 1st when Mr. Bozung was arrested on another one of the 
cases he is charged with which we're about to go to trial on. 
He was interviewed that day relative to this case also. A tape 
was made of the recording, I'm sorry, a recording was made of 
the interview including the recitation of Miranda rights. And 
speaking for Mr. Johnson, I believe he's going to submit to the 
Court an exhibit that Mr. Bozung signed a written waiver of 
rights form which we commonly see. I stipulate to the 
submission of that today. 
It would be my intention today simply to submit the 
tape that I was provided by the State which represents that 
interview as evidence. I would argue about what you would see 
in that evidence. I don't know that you want to hear that 
today. I would think that maybe Mr. Johnson ought to review 
the tape and it would be probably my position to make the 
arguments about what I do and don't hear in the tape and then 
for him to respond in writing if that's --
THE COURT: Let me ask. Is the written Miranda 
filled out immediately after the oral Miranda is given? 
MR. MEANS: It would be my statement that it was 
filled out simultaneously. 
MR. JOHNSON: And if we want to briefly call 
Detective Moosman just to establish that foundation. 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
the 
in. 
you 
the 
you 
stand 
MR. MEANS: That's fine. 
THE COURT: I think that's a factual issue. 
MR. MEANS: That's fine. 
MR. JOHNSON: State would call Detective Moosman to 
THE COURT: All right. Please come up and be sworn 
DETECTIVE MOOSMAN 
Called by the State, being first J 
Duly sworn, testified as follows: 
THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the testimony 
are about to give in the case now before the Court will be 
truth 
God? 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help 1 
THE WITNESS: I do. 
THE COURT: Let's get a spelling on his name. 
THE WITNESS: Moosman, M-o-o-s-m-a-n. 1 
THE COURT: I had it right. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JOHNSON: 
Detective, with whom do you work? 
Alpine Highland Police Department. I 
What's your position? 
Investigations. 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
Q Okay. So you're a detective? 
A Yes. 
Q And in that capacity were you working on May 1st, 
2007? 
A Yes, I was. 
Q Did you interview a Gareth Bozung? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q What were the circumstances that you were 
interviewing him briefly? 
A I was interviewing him regarding a case of an 
overdose and drugs that we were investigating. 
Q Okay. Where did this interview take place? 
A It took place at Lehi Police Department. 
Q And how did Mr. Bozung come to be at the police 
department? 
A Lehi Police Department picked him up on other 
charges. I was notified he was there and asked them to hold 
him and not transport him to jail until I could respond and 
talk to him. 
Q So he was in custody at that time? 
A Yes, he was. 
Q With handcuffs on? 
A Yes. 
Q Awaiting other charges? 
A Yes. 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
Q Specifically where in the jail or where in the police 
department did this take place? 
A Second floor in the interview room. 
Q And who else was with you if anyone? 
A Nobody. 
Q Okay. And what sort of recording did you employ? 
A We had both video and I also had a pocket digital 
voice recorder. 
Q And did you turn those on before talking with 
Mr. Bozung? 
A Yes, we did. 
THE COURT: Both? 
THE WITNESS: Both. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. JOHNSON: Q. And did you submit a copy of the 
videotape of that interview to my office to give to Mr. Means? 
A Only the audible -- audiotapes I believe. The 
videotape was booked into evidence. 
Q Okay. And how did this interview start? What did 
you say to Mr. Bozung? 
A When he first came in, he was just telling me about 
the reason he was there and what Lehi had picked him up for 
while they got him a drink. Once the drink was provided to 
him, he talked about some other irrelevant things and then at 
that point he -- we started by going over the admonition, the 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
rights form. 
Q These initial statements by the defendant, were they 
made at the request of -- in response to your questions or just 
kind of spontaneous? 
A No, he was just telling me different things on his 
own. 
Q Okay. And then you said that you gave him -- you 
read him his rights or explained to him his rights. Could you 
explain that process? 
A I pulled out an admonition of rights form and sat 
down and informed him, because he was in custody, that I needed 
to go over his rights. I started out by reading the first 
line. 
MR. JOHNSON: If I can approach, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. JOHNSON: Q. Showing you what's been previously 
marked as State's Exhibit 1. 
Do you recognize that? 
A That is a form that was filled out at that time. 
MR. JOHNSON: The State would move to admit No. 1 
into evidence. 
MR. MEANS: No objection. 
THE COURT: Okay. It's received. 
(State's Exhibit No. 1 was received into evidence.) 
MR. JOHNSON: If I might give that to the Court to 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
review as Detective Moosman testifies. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. JOHNSON: Q. Okay. With -- where were you 
sitting or standing in relation to the defendant while this 
form was given to him? 
A To his left. 
Q You were sitting next to him? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. And how -- did you go over the form in detail 
with him? 
A I turned around so he could read it. At that time I 
started reading it to him. I read the first line that he had a 
right to remain silent. I asked him if he understood that and 
he stated that he did. At that time Mr. Bozung told me that 
the Lehi Police Department had just read him those rights and 
he asked me if he could just read it and sign the form and 
because of his emotional state I agreed to. 
Q Okay. When he said he'd already been read his 
rights, what did you understand that to be? 
A That he had already been given his Miranda rights by 
the Lehi Police Department. 
Q The same ones that are on the admonition form that's 
Exhibit 1? 
A That's correct. 
Q So approximately -- well, what did Mr. Bozung do next 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
after you told him to read over it? 
A At that point I told him I needed him to initial by 
each thing stating he had read it and that he understood those 
rights. 
Q Did you witness him doing just that? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q And is this with a pen or pencil that you provided? 
A Pen. 
Q And so he went down each one of the rights and 
initialed? 
A Yes, during the time he was asking me some questions 
and making statements, but he did. 
Q Do you recall what those were? 
A I do not. 
Q Okay. Were they anything of the nature of I want a 
lawyer? 
A No, they were not. 
Q I don't want to talk to you? 
A No, they were not. And they were not questions 
regarding Miranda. They were just questions in general from my 
memory. 
Q Okay. At the end of the form after he initialed all 
the other parts, what's at the bottom part of the form as far 
as a waiver? 
A It states that he has been warned regarding his 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
rights, that he's read the above statements regarding his 
rights, that he understands what they are, that he was willing 
to make a statement and answer questions, that he did not want 
a lawyer at that time, and that he understood and knew what he 
was doing and no promises or threats had been made to him and 
no pressure or coertion of any kind had been used against him. 
Q Okay. And then below that admonition or waiver is 
there a line for him to sign? 
A There is. 
Q And did he sign that in your presence? 
A Yes, he did. 
Q Is there anything else on that form that you think is 
relevant to our discussion of Miranda today? 
A Nope, not that I can think of. 
Q Okay. And to be clear, during that whole process 
before you started asking him about questions of this incident, 
he did not invoke his right to remain silent or to consult an 
attorney? 
A No, he did not. 
Q And after he signed that, what did you do next? 
A After he signed that, I signed the form on the bottom 
as author initiating the rights, filed that with the rest of my 
paperwork and started interviewing him regarding the death of 
Joshua Razeeka (phonetic) and his role during the night that 
Joshua Razeeka died. 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
Q Okay. Did he make any incriminating statements as a 
result of the questioning? 
A Yes, he did. 
Q What were those in general? 
A He notified me that he had sold Joshua Razeeka 
heroin, that he had been in possession of heroin, that it was 
in his pocket at the time we arrived at the house to start our 
investigation, and also that he had secured a bong from Joshua 
Razeeka's room and had hidden it so we would not find it. 
Q Okay. As a result of that conversation and your 
other investigation, you forwarded that case to be filed as the 
one we're here on today? 
A That's correct. 
MR. JOHNSON: That's all I have for this witness. 
CROS S-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MEANS: 
Q Officer Moosman, you both audibly and visually 
recorded the entire interview? 
A Yes. 
Q To include the discussion you just advised us of 
regarding his rights? 
A That's correct. 
Q And the signing of the form? 
A That's correct. 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
Q Have you reviewed -- let me back up. 
You have provided the State with the audio portion? 
A Yes, I have. 
Q But not the video yet? 
A I don't believe we have. 
Q Do you still have the video? 
A Itfs right here. 
Q Good. All right. You have reviewed the video? 
A I have not. 
Q Since the date it was taken? 
A No, I haven't. 
Q Have you reviewed the audio? 
A Just briefly. Parts of it. 
Q Did you -- did you make the recording yourself? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Speaking of the audio recording? 
A Yes. 
Q And the video recording also? 
A That was done by the Lehi Police Department. 
Q Insofar as you reviewed the audio recording and based 
upon you being there and based upon you doing your recording, 
any reason in your mind why the audio recording of the entire 
event would not be accurate? 
A No. 
Q It would provide an accurate record of what occurred 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
that day? 
A Yes, it would. 
Q Regarding your testimony today that Mr. Bozung told 
you he had previously been given his Miranda rights by Lehi 
city officers, is that what he said? 
A He told me, as I started going over Miranda, that 
Lehi officers had already gone over that with him. 
Q Is that your only knowledge of if or to what extent 
he was read his Miranda rights by Lehi was Gareth's own 
statement? 
A Yes. 
Q You weren't present when -- just ask the obvious 
questions -- you weren't present when Lehi officers advised him 
of his Miranda rights if they did? 
A No, I was not. 
Q You're not personally aware of that --
A No, I'm not. 
Q --if that happened? 
MR. MEANS: That's all I have, your Honor, for 
purposes of this hearing. 
MR. JOHNSON: State has no redirect. 
THE COURT: All right. You may be seated. 
MR. MEANS: Could I make one suggestion, though? 
THE COURT: Well, it's about the same suggestion I'm 
going to make I suspect. 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
MR. MEANS: Okay. 
THE COURT: Any other witnesses or evidence we need 
to put on? My suggestion is that, first of all, the State 
needs to get a copy of the video and provide it to Mr. Means so 
both parties have both the video and the audio recording and 
that the briefs be submitted to the Court along with a copy of 
the video and audio so that you do your briefing with both of 
you having seen and heard everything there is to see and hear. 
And then the State could respond to yours, Mr. Means, and along 
with that provide a copy of both the tapes and --
MR. MEANS: Judge, I've already filed a motion to 
suppress which is a bare bones motion. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. MEANS: Do you want me to take the lead in 
briefing? 
THE COURT: I think so. I think it's your briefing 
and your bare bones was exactly what we wanted for purposes of 
where we are now. I would suggest that I give this back and 
then make that a part --
MR. JOHNSON: Certainly, your Honor. 
THE COURT: --of either motion or either brief so I 
get it, but that's the logical way to approach it. 
MR. JOHNSON: Yep. 
THE COURT: Is that what you were going to suggest, 
Mr. Means? 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
saying. 
could we 
MR. MEANS: 
THE COURT: 
MR. MEANS: 
THE COURT: 
MR. MEANS: 
THE COURT: 
I don't know. I don't know what you were 
The way that I set out the briefing. 
Yes. 
Is that what you were going to suggest? 
Yes. 
All right. How soon -- well, how soon 
get this videotape copied? 
MR. JOHNSON : He said he can make it today and bring 
it down first of next week or mail it today. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, why don't we have him make 
the copies for both. 
MR. JOHNSON: Yeah, and I will give him Mr. Means' 
address and I'll mail one to him and he'll mail one to me. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. JOHNSON: We'll do that. 
THE COURT: All right. If you'll double check them 
after copies are made to make sure they really work. Sometimes 
we have that problem. So if he gets that to you early next 
week, gets it mailed off today. 
OFFICER MOOSMAN: I'll drop that in the mail today, 
your Honor. 
MR. MEANS: Is there a chance you could copy to 
digital? 
OFFICER MOOSMAN: We do not have that ability at our 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
police department I'm afraid. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. MEANS: It's just easier. 
MR. JOHNSON: It's not as high technology as the 
public defender's office. 
MR. MEANS: We have video too. 
MR. JOHNSON: Oh, okay. 
THE COURT: There's a few old-fashioned machines 
around. And if he gets that to you in the mail today, which 
means you'll probably have it by the time you come back from 
the holiday on Monday, how long would it take you to get your 
motion in? 
MR. MEANS: Let me state it this way. We all have 
two trials with Mr. Bozung on the 11th and 12th back to back. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. MEANS: I would prefer that I have a chance to 
focus on those first before I do this motion. I don't know 
that it changes his status or the State's position, so if I 
could have until after the first of the year to actually do 
this. 
THE COURT: Let me ask this. Is this something we 
want to address as far as a briefing schedule at the end of the 
second trial? 
MR. JOHNSON: That would be more appropriate. 
MR. MEANS: I think so. 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
THE COURT: I think depending on what happens in 
those two trials it's probably going to affect what happens in 
this case in all reality so I'm that realistic, but if we could 
still have you get them the tapes immediately so they have 
them. 
And why don't you schedule this for a status 
conference on the date of the second trial which is the 12th; 
is that correct? 
MR. JOHNSON: It's a Tuesday. If that's the 12th 
then --
THE COURT: Can't be the 12th. 
MR. JOHNSON: It's 10th and 11th. 
THE COURT: So let's set this for a scheduling 
conference with regard to the motion to suppress to be handled 
at the end of the second trial on the 11th, okay? 
MR. JOHNSON: Okay. 
THE COURT: Sometime after five I'm guessing. We'll 
just put it for 4:00 for the fun of it and if we're done before 
then, great. And is our pretrial next week on the two other 
cases? 
MR. JOHNSON: I believe it is, yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay. As far as we know, we're going 
forward on the two other cases? 
MR. MEANS: I think so. 
MR. JOHNSON: For the State, yeah. 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT 
THE COURT: All right. Okay. So we won't worry 
about setting the schedule until we know where we are on the 
other two cases. All right. Sounds good to me. Thank you. 
Let me ask. Do both parties have a copy of the audio 
tape now? 
MR. MEANS: Yes. 
MR. JOHNSON: Yes. 
(PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED 
MATTER WERE CONCLUDED.) 
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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 
(January 23, 2008) 
THE JUDGE: Okay. All right. It is 9:00 
o'clock. I'm ready for anything. 
MR. JOHNSON: One through four, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Are we ready for Mr. Bozung? 
MR. MEANS: We can be, Your Honor. Yes. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Do you want to start with the 
sentencing or do you want to start with the motion to 
suppress? 
MR. MEANS: Let's do the sentencing first, 
Your Honor, if that's all right with you. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. All right 
SENTENCING 
MR. MEANS: Judge, I was not given a copy of the 
PSI, I have not received it yet. So I'm speaking from my 
memory of a review of it with Mr. Bozung this morning. 
THE JUDGE: Well, can I just say as a prefix I'm a 
little concerned about the matrix. They show two prior 
felony convictions— 
MR. MEANS: Right. 
THE JUDGE: — and the criminal history I had in 
front of me just showed one. 
MR. MEANS: And I was going to point that out to 
the court. 
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THE JUDGE: Makes a two point difference and puts 
him down a little. 
MR. MEANS: It does. Additionally, Your Honor, 
while in certain parts of the PSI it makes reference to the 
case that's number three on your calendar today as being a 
present offense, it's not addressed in the recommendation 
and it's not, the face of the recommendation as I read it 
anyway. 
THE JUDGE: I do have a separate— 
MR. MEANS: Do you have two PSIs? 
THE JUDGE: I've, I've got two PSIs. 
MR. MEANS: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: I have one that covers the two 
cases— 
MR. MEANS: All right. 
THE JUDGE: — ending in 2801 and 3285. 
MR. MEANS: Well, there you go. 
THE JUDGE: And then I have a separate one for 
1958. 
MR. MEANS: All right. We did not, I haven't 
seen the 1958 recommendation but I'm assuming that the, it's 
the same— 
THE JUDGE: Same recommendation— 
MR. MEANS: — for commitment. 
THE JUDGE: — and the same matrix with the same 
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score. 
MR. MEANS: Well, that's the first observation 
I'd make is that I believe he should be scored with a total 
score of 10 which would place him on the next lower row— 
THE JUDGE: Yes. 
MR. MEANS: — in the matrix. For the two cases 
that are together, and I've forgotten their numbers, my 
memory was that would still land him in a black or a dark 
gray square. 
THE JUDGE: 
months to 72. 
MR. MEANS: 
THE JUDGE: 
Yes. It would take him from 78 
And in the other case— 
Takes him one row down and 
intermediate. 
MR. MEANS: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: I believe. Let me just make sure my 
memory is right. He's in 18 months in intermediate, it 
would take him to 16 months in intermediate. 
MR. MEANS: He's in intermediate either way? 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. MEANS: Because it's a second degree? 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. MEANS: Is it listed at— 
THE JUDGE: Second degree possession. 
MR. MEANS: Possession. All right. 
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THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). Yes. 
MR. MEANS: As a part of my arguments on 
sentencing, Your Honor, I want to also argue my motion that 
the court consider under Rule 402, 76-3-402 that the court... 
Did you get my motion to enter judgment in the next 
lower category of offense? 
THE JUDGE: Which one? Which case? 
MR. MEANS: It would be in a — 
MR. JOHNSON: 2801. 
MR. MEANS: 2801. The case, the only case that a, 
has a first degree felony. 
MR. JOHNSON: The trial, yes. 
THE JUDGE: Oh. 
MR. JOHNSON: For the trial. 
THE JUDGE: I think I did. I just couldn't figure 
out why I only got it in one case. Yes, it's here. 
MR. MEANS: The other matters are frankly just not 
subject to that motion. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Well— 
MR. JOHNSON: And the state did file a response. 
I don't know if the court has received that. 
THE JUDGE: No, we haven't. When did it come 
m ? 
MR. MEANS: I think I got it yesterday. 
MR. JOHNSON: I've got a copy for the court. 
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THE JUDGE: I'm short a clerk. It's probably 
downstairs. And we were in court from 9:00 to 5:00 yesterday 
with an hour on lunch break. That's an extra copy we could 
keep? 
MR. JOHNSON: Yes. 
THE JUDGE: Well, let me ask you this, 
Mr. Means. 
MR. MEANS: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
THE JUDGE: Let's say I do follow their 
recommendation and I send him up to prison. 
MR. MEANS: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
THE JUDGE: Do you want to fix that matrix with 
AP&P? 
MR. MEANS: At the very least I want to fix that 
matrix, yes. 
THE JUDGE: Because it's going to follow him to 
the board of pardons. And I think in all fairness, I don't 
know if it's going to change their recommendation but a, at 
the very least if I, and I haven't made the decision, but 
if I were to send him to prison I think it's very important 
that he go up with the right matrix in front of the board. 
MR. MEANS: And what you're suggesting is is that 
the department make that change so that it's official? 
THE JUDGE: You talk to them, Mr. Johnson talks to 
them. And I mean, Mr. Johnson, do you see the matrix the 
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same way we do? 
MR. JOHNSON: I do. With respect to that, 
Your Honor, I was looking further on the supervision history, 
I, I thought that one of these is a (inaudible word) while he 
was on pretrial release for the other. That's what I was 
looking at. That would only bring him up one more point I 
understand. So it would still be in that third category. 
And my understanding is that we have to reduce that to 
writing because the board is not going to get anything we do 
in court. 
THE JUDGE: Right. So either the option is that 
we do it by an order or we get AP&P to do it. 
MR. JOHNSON: Yes. 
THE JUDGE: And I think the safest thing for him 
is to have it in AP&P records so it's right. 
MR. MEANS: Probably is. 
MR. JOHNSON: That's what they pull up, yes. 
THE JUDGE: Yes. 
MR. JOHNSON: I'm fine with passing this to any 
other matters that are trailing, whatever the court wants. 
THE JUDGE: Do you think you can do it in a week, 
Mr. Means, or shall we give it two? 
MR. MEANS: It doesn't matter to me personally, 
Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Mr. Bozung, are you willing to wait a 
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couple of weeks so we can fix this? 
THE DEFENDANT: That's fine, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. I think it's the fair thing 
for you. You know, whether you go up or not you want your 
history with AP&P to be accurate, and right now I don't think 
it is. 
So I'm going to continue the three sentencings. 
I'll ask my clerk when you get the file to enter the state's 
memorandum in opposition in one file. I'll put it on top 
with the transcript that's floating loose in there. And 
then let's continue the three sentencings that are number 
two, three and four on the calendar today a, for disposition 
for sentencing on February 6th which is two weeks from today 
so that both attorneys, if you think you've got a problem 
that needs to be fixed— 
MR. JOHNSON: I'll speak with Mr. Means. 
THE JUDGE: — you'll each have the chance to 
talk to AP&P and see if we can get an accurate matrix that 
can be relied upon by me and/or the board of pardons. 
Okay? 
MR. MEANS: That's fine. Thank you. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
THE JUDGE: Let's turn to the motion to 
suppress. Are you ready to argue that today? 
I have, this is our file number 071402713. 
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I've read a, the three memos from the attorneys, I've read 
the State vs Snyder case, I've also looked at the a, DVD 
myself. I've taken copious notes about what happens where. 
So I'm interested... And I also still have in the court file 
the copy of the a, admonition of rights waiver that he signed 
which we saw on the a, DVD. So I'm ready to hear your 
arguments. 
MR. MEANS: Actually, Your Honor, I don't have 
anything to add. If you've viewed the tape it speaks for 
itself. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. MEANS: You have observed what I wanted the 
court to observe. I've made my comments on what I've seen 
in the tape. I'm sure the state has. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. MEANS: And if you've seen it then I think you 
can make a decision based upon a, in my opinion on the 
pleadings and a, having viewed the tape. 
THE JUDGE: All right. 
MR. MEANS: It's the best evidence of what 
occurred. 
MR. JOHNSON: And that's the state's position. 
I don't think we can add anything else to what we saw. 
THE JUDGE: You guys aren't going to help me 
here? I was waiting for clarifying arguments from counsel. 
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MR. JOHNSON: A ruling for the state please, 
Your Honor. 
MR. MEANS: Yes. My clarifications are in, in 
the writings. I think that there's an obligation on the 
part of the person who reads and rights to do so. Snyder 
speaks of an officer who obviously because of his a, training 
and experience probably has the rights memorized in his 
head. And they didn't find that just telling him you 
already know the rights to be sufficient. They required 
that there be a recitation or some reminding at that moment, 
because at that moment when things are critical, not what a 
person might know from the past. And I think it steps down 
one, two or three levels when you have a defendant who might 
have had previous experience with his rights having been 
read to him, but certainly not as much experience or 
understanding as an officer would have to have that 
defendant simply read the statement, first of all number one, 
and find that to be a sufficient a, explanation of his 
rights. Or as in this case having an ongoing conversation 
about unrelated items going on at the same time as the 
defendant is allegedly or hopefully reading. 
And my own observation of the tape is is that 
Mr. Bozung is completely focused on problems with his 
personal life, with his mom, with his family, talking about 
what happened in the previous arrest, and Josh Rozeka 
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(phonetic), and all kinds of things going through his head 
as he's writing down apparently his initials. But 
certainly not looking, reading, comprehending and then 
executing, and then reading the second admonition and 
executing. An ongoing colloquy with the officer about 
unrelated items. I don't think that's a sufficient a, I 
don't think there's by a preponderance of the evidence a, 
proof that he was either read his rights, recited his rights 
or otherwise understood them from his reading, apparent 
reading of them. 
THE JUDGE: Let me ask. Based on the Strand 
case and then the other, I'm sorry, the Snyder case and any 
other case law you might have looked at, had he just been 
handed the waiver form with no extraneous distractions and 
read through it, would he be safe? 
MR. MEANS: I'm not, I don't think— 
THE JUDGE: Is that enough? 
MR. MEANS: I don't think so, Your Honor. I think 
that's kind of an open question. I've never seen that 
addressed directly— 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. MEANS: — and I've never argued it 
directly. But it, but he has to be advised of his rights. 
I suppose that there's an argument to be made that when 
you're given the written word and you read it you've been 
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advised. 
But the issue is do you know how to read, do you 
know how to comprehend what you read, were you focused on 
what you were reading, were you really reading it. So 
there's, I suppose it's really a proof problem— 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. MEANS: — about whether or not if you hand a 
person a piece of paper he's really— 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. MEANS: — done what's necessary to advise 
himself by reading those rights. And I think the better 
practice is that the officer needs to recite them. 
THE JUDGE: Anything else, Mr. Johnson? 
MR. JOHNSON: I just think that a, the Snyder 
case is fairly distinguishable from this. And I think, and 
if this was like Snyder that when the defendant said oh, 
I've already been, I've already been read these just a minute 
ago, then the officer says okay, and takes away the paper and 
then just starts with his interrogation, I think that would 
be more similar to Snyder saying well, he said he understands 
so I assume he does. 
Here the officer didn't do that. He said well, 
you still need to read through each one. I think that would 
be the preferred method is to have the officer so that we're 
making sure he's not missing anything. 
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We have the proof of what he read right in front 
of you, the court. The tape, as the court no doubt noted 
with the counter, it was approximately two minutes that a, he 
was looking down during this, even during his one-sided 
conversation he was looking down, appeared he was looking 
from side to side, he had to initial each one. 
At the end Officer Moosman, Detective Moosman 
asked him a, if a, if he understood and agreed with the 
waiver section. Then a, he said yes. And he signed it. 
And then Detective Moosman said he'd signed it as a 
witness. 
Detective Moosman took every precaution under 
these circumstances to make sure that the defendant 
understood his rights even though Lehi police had just read 
them to him minutes before on the Motel 6 case that he's 
already to plead guilty on. 
THE JUDGE: How do I know that? 
MR. JOHNSON: Based on his— 
THE JUDGE: All he said, all that he said was, 
all that the defendant said was a... The officer said 
because you, roughly, because you've been arrested so I need 
to go through your rights with you. And he reads to him you 
do have the right to remain silent. He asked him do you 
understand that. And he hands him the pen. And the 
defendant says I can just read this, pointing to the door, he 
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just read me my rights. That's all I got. 
So I don't... To me the problem is I don't know 
how the other rights were read and whether or not they were 
sufficient. 
MR. JOHNSON: Okay. And that's why this is 
different than Snyder because the officer didn't just stop at 
that point and say okay, well we'll assume that you, that was 
taken care of properly. 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. JOHNSON: Detective Moosman walked through 
these copiously on the paper, had him look at that. If 
Mr. Bozung had just initialled, initialled and handed it in 
without looking at it I would agree that we'd be in a 
different situation. But where he sat there and went 
through each one and initialled by each one, didn't just 
initial once at the bottom, it seems clear by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he did knowingly and 
voluntarily waive his Miranda rights on that day. 
The state would submit it. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Anything else? 
MR. MEANS: I'd like to respond, Judge. I think 
you've hit upon a good point and I wanted to make that, that, 
there's no record, you don't have any record of what— 
THE JUDGE: Huh-uh (negative). 
MR. MEANS: — what was done with regard to a 
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prior reading possibly of his rights. We don't know if it 
was done in the same manner this was done, if it was done 
with the right wording, if it was, what rights were read to 
him. There, there is no record in this case of him having 
been read his rights previous to the one that you saw in the 
tape, number one. 
And then number two, I would just simply take 
issue with the state that Officer Moosman cautiously and 
completely and copiously went through his rights with him. 
He simply read the first right very clearly, you have a 
right to remain silent, here's a piece of paper after he 
heard what a, Mr. Bozung said. And then they started 
talking about all kinds of different things. There wasn't a 
pausing and a waiting while he read. They continued their, 
their discussion about unrelated matters while presumably, 
possibly I guess is a better word, possibly Mr. Bozung is 
reading and talking and initialing all at the same time. 
He certainly wasn't cautiously, he, Officer Moosman wasn't 
cautiously taking care to make sure that Mr. Bozung 
understood each of his rights. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Anything else? 
MR. MEANS: Submit it, please. 
MR. JOHNSON: The state would submit it 
COURT'S RULING 
THE JUDGE: Okay. We don't have a transcript 
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of either the preliminary hearing or the suppression 
hearing. But I've got my notes out and from those notes I 
make my decision, in addition to the tape and EXHIBIT #1 
from November 21st, '07 which would be the suppression 
hearing is my guess. Yes. That was, November 21st was 
the evidentiary hearing on the suppression motion, and then 
the preliminary hearing was on October 10th. 
And from the suppression hearing we learned that 
the interview took place at the Lehi Police Department. 
That the defendant had been picked up by Lehi on other 
charges. He was in custody. The officer at that time at 
that hearing thought that the defendant had his handcuffs, 
had handcuffs on him. Very clearly the DVD tells us he did 
not. He reaches across, he shakes hands with the officer, 
and he also opens his own can of Mountain Dew when they 
bring in to him. So he's clearly not handcuffed, but he's 
clearly in custody. 
And the officer tells him because you're in 
custody we need to do your rights. They are 
Officer Moosman, M-O-O-S-M-A-N, and the defendant are seated 
across from each other at a table. There are some things 
in the way so we can't always see the defendant's hands 
clearly. I think the can of pop is there and a cup and 
there's something else I couldn't identify that was to the 
left. But nevertheless there was enough I could see what 
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was going on. 
All right. I think with that I can go to my notes 
from the DVD. And the DVD that we're talking about has 
been supplied by a, Officer Moosman and it is a, a DVD of the 
entire, I guess of the entire a, interview. I only watched 
a, the initial portion that dealt with the issue here today. 
I did not watch the entire thing. 
The defendant made a few preliminary statements to 
the officer. He was talking about a, his friend Josh who 
had died, said that a, at... 
And there seems to be a disparity in the times on 
the rights admonition waiver and the clock on the, the a, 
DVD. The time on the rights admonition the officer put 
that it was signed at 14:40, and the clock is running 
starting at 13:36. So I think the clock must be, the clock 
on the DVD recorder must be an hour off. So it's not of 
great concern to me but just for the record that's why the 
time on the EXHIBIT #1 and the time, the times that I give 
are going to be different. 
The a, so the defendant comes in and shakes hands 
at 13:36, so that would be 1:26 in the afternoon on the DVD 
clock. He's crying, he talks about how he's had a fight 
with his mom. A minute later he's talking about his friend 
Josh that broke his heart. And then at that point a 
uniformed officer brings in a Mountain Dew for him. Talks 
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about how his mom has accused him of stealing a, I believe 
some pills, I couldn't tell exactly what it was, it sounded 
like maybe it was Adderall that he had taken, he said he had 
taken five or six pills. 
At a, 13:37:50 the officer tells him he just wants 
to talk to him about Josh. And he, and all my quotes are 
basic paraphrases. Because you've been arrested I need to 
go through your rights with you. And so at 13:38:10 he 
reads to the defendant you do have the right to remain 
silent and asks him do you understand that? He reaches 
across and hands the defendant a pen. And the defendant 
says I can just read this. And he points kind of back over 
his shoulder and says he just read me my rights, and he says 
that at 13:38:17. And the officer says if you'll read it, 
or something like if you read it, if you understand it put 
your initial by it. And from what I could see the first 
time he wrote on the document was at 13:38:21, and I'm 
assuming that was his first initial. 
And then he continues to talk about his stepmother 
and his mom. And all of this conversation comes from him 
while he is putting his initials on the page. The second 
initial or the second writing that he did occurred at 
13:38:29. And the a, third initial happens at 13:38:36. And 
the fourth initial happens at 13:39:03. 
Now, through all of this he's talking about his 
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stepmother, he's talking about his mom selling the house to 
them, which I would assume would be his stepmother and his 
dad, and how they turned around and sold it for 400,000, and 
the selling price had been 175, and they were supposed to 
give his mom cash but they turned around and sold it for 
400,000. And then he stops momentarily before he signs the 
fourth set of initials at 13:39:03. 
And then the officer shows him another something 
that he should read. My assumption is that if we're going 
down in order it would to be the middle paragraph that says, 
If you decide to answer questions now 
without a lawyer/attorney present you 
will still have the right to stop 
answering questions at any time. You 
also have the right to stop answering at 
any time until you've talked to a 
lawyer/attorney. 
Of course, that's just an assumption I'm making 
assuming that he went down in an order and signed sentences 
one, two, three, four which are the basic Miranda warnings, 
and then signed next to the paragraph. I don't have any way 
of knowing that. 
But the officer tells him to read something in 
addition and then to sign, and that's at at 13:39 I 
think :08. 
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And the defendant continues to talk but while he's 
talking he does take the pen across the page as if he's 
following the words. But I don't know that for sure, it's 
just kind of what it looked like. That happens at 
13:39:59. 
Oh, and he did, he did initial, after the officer 
told him to read something and then sign he did initial 
something for the fifth time at the 13:39:33. And then he 
continues to talk, takes the pen across the page as if he's 
following the words. 
And then he initials while he's talking about his 
dad, the sixth initial. Is that right? Yes. He initials 
the next I assume, possibly the next paragraph while he's 
talking about how his dad kicked him out of the house. 
And that's at the 13:40:13 right after the officer says just 
sign right here. 
At 13:40:16 the officer asks the defendant if he 
understands everything and says if you do then sign right 
there and the officer says he'll sign as a witness. And 
that's at 13:40:25. And at that point the defendant I guess 
would sign his full name down where it says signature under 
the last paragraph, Waiver of Rights. And then shortly 
after that the officer takes it back and then signs it 
himself. And they go right into the discussion of what the 
officer really wanted to talk about. 
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Now, I'm satisfied with the standard that's 
outlined in the defense memo that I must look at the totality 
of the circumstances and whether the defendant has knowingly 
and voluntarily, and from another case intelligently, and 
I'm sure intentionally as well, waived the right to remain 
silent and to forego the advice of counsel prior to an 
in-custody interrogation. I'm also satisfied that the 
waiver must be clear and unambiguous as well as voluntary. 
And that the standard I'm using is preponderance of the 
evidence. 
The concern that I have with how this was handled 
is that the defendant, as he is supposedly signing a document 
this important, is clearly distracted and his mind on other 
things. 
Now, it was tempting to place the responsibility 
on the defendant and say hey, this is the way he chose to do 
it, he was satisfied, he felt like he knew what he was doing, 
he was happy to keep talking while he read this document, a, 
he said he had just had his rights read to him by another 
officer, and place the burden on him to do it right. 
But I don't think the case law does that. And 
the case that's cited by the defense, the Snider case which 
is State of Utah versus Barry Snyder 860 P.2d 351 I believe 
makes it clear that whatever the background is that it has 
to still be a very clear advisement of rights with a very 
PACT 77 
clear understanding. If the lawyer is not up to it based 
on the background, or a police officer is not up to handling 
it himself based on his background, then a defendant 
certainly is not. 
The problem here is that the defendant's attention 
was very clearly divided. And I have nothing before me that 
persuades me that he paid absolute attention to what he 
was doing. Everything I have persuades me he did not. 
The officer should have stopped him and said don't talk, we 
need to do this right, and the officer didn't do that. 
And so the officer allowed the defendant to prattle on 
about other things that not even the officer was interested 
in. Stealing pills from his stepmother was not the reason 
that the defendant was there. And frankly, there's some 
concern that he's admitting to possibly stealing pills in the 
middle of a Miranda warning and so that doesn't help 
either. The officer should have stopped him and said wait a 
minute, you might be admitting a crime here and let's get 
through your Miranda rights first. That happens at the very 
beginning. And then he was onto the other family issues. 
But I am not persuaded by what I saw on the DVD 
that the defendant could have made a knowing, intelligent, 
voluntary, intentional waiver of his right to remain silent, 
his knowledge that anything he said could and would be used 
against him in a court of law, that he was giving up his 
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right to an attorney, to speak with an attorney and have an 
attorney present, and that he had a right to have one 
appointed. 
The fact that he seemed to pay some attention to 
the paper is not, is not persuasive. And even the fact that 
at the end when the officer asked him if he understands 
everything and he indicates he does, based on his attention 
to the matter before him I'm not persuaded by the 
preponderance of the evidence that this was a knowing waiver 
of his rights under the Miranda case. 
So I grant the motion and find that he did not 
make the necessary knowing, intelligent, voluntary and 
intentional waiver of his Miranda rights and I suppress 
anything that came after that from that particular 
interview. 
As to any other information the state has, it's not 
affected, but as to this interview it is. 
So a, Mr. Means I'll ask you to do the appropriate 
findings, conclusion and order. 
And where do the parties want to go from here on 
this case? 
MR. JOHNSON: Can we set it on further proceedings 
on the next date— 
THE JUDGE: Same date? 
MR. JOHNSON: — set for sentencing, February 
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6th. 
THE JUDGE: Is that okay? 
MR. MEANS: That works for us too, Judge. 
THE JUDGE: All right. He's actually still at a 
waiver hearing, I'm sorry, at arraignment. Since he's had a 
preliminary, let me see, has he ever entered his pleas? 
MR. JOHNSON: Yes. October 17th he pled not 
guilty, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: All right. So actually we're at 
pretrial. So we'll call that February 6th a pretrial and 
we'll take it from there. 
MR. JOHNSON: Can we do that at 8:30? 
THE JUDGE: Yes, we'll do it at 8:30 with the 
other sentencing, at sentencings. 
MR. JOHNSON: Thank you. 
THE JUDGE: All right. Thank you very much. 
MR. MEANS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Now, do the parties want me to keep 
these two items of evidence and have my clerk put them in as 
evidence from his hearing? 
MR. JOHNSON: That's fine. 
THE JUDGE: We can just put them in an envelope 
and leave them in the file. 
MR. JOHNSON: Yes. If we can just do that, the 
state has got its own copies. 
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THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. JOHNSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: So I'll ask you to put these two in an 
envelope, separate envelope in the file. 
WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
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4TH D I S T I C H 
STATF OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
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vs. 
GARETH BOZUNG, 
Defendant. 
DISTRICT No. 071402713 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, and ORDER SUPPRESSING 
DEFENDANT'S ADMISSIONS 
Hon. Claudia Laycock 
This matter came on for oral argument on Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
Statement on the 23rd day of January, 2008. This Court, having reviewed the parties' 
written memoranda and the CD recording of the subject interview and having given due 
consideration to the arguments of the parties, now enters these: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On 1 May, 2007 Defendant was arrested and retained in custody by Lehi City 
Police officers on charges unrelated to this case. 
2. Detective Moosman of the Highland-Alpine Police Department interviewed 
Defendant at the Lehi City Police Department while Defendant remained in custody. 
3. The entire interview was visually and audibly recorded. A CD disk recording of 
the interview has been admitted into evidence. From such recording the following 
sequence of events is apparent to this Court. 
4. When Defendant entered the interview room he appeared distraught and 
concerned about unrelated personal family matters. 
5. Det. Moosman engaged Defendant briefly about such family matters; another 
officer brought Defendant a Mountain Dew to drink; Defendant was not handcuffed or 
otherwise physically restrained; Defendant and Det. Moosman sat across from each 
other at a table. 
6. Before beginning the interrogation, Det. Moosman told Defendant that it was 
necessary to go through his rights with him and explained "right here you do have the 
right to remain silent, do you understand?" 
7. Defendant responded "yea." 
8. Det. Moosman passed Defendant a document and asked Defendant to initial 
"number 1 saying you under stand that." The document that Det. Moosman was 
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referring to was the waiver of rights form that has been made an exhibit in the file of this 
matter; the form does include written admonitions of all the rights that are required by 
Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
9. Defendant accepted the form and said "I can just read it, he just read me my 
rights." 
10. Det. Moosman responded, "ok, that's fine, if you'll just read 'em and if you 
understand 'em if you'll initial 'em." 
11. From this point forward Det. Moosman did not advise Defendant of his 
further rights but allowed Defendant to apparently read the form and place his initials 
beside certain paragraphs in sequences that are uncertain to this Court. 
12. Simultaneous with Defendant's handling the form, he and Det. Moosman 
continued to discuss matters unrelated to Defendant's constitutional rights including, 
the sale of Defendant's family home, the soaring price of homes, a family dispute 
concerning Defendant's use of his mother's prescription drugs, the fact that his father 
feels he is selfish, that he has been kicked out of his house for his language, that he 
hadn't use, (drugs) that day, and that a "kid" he met last night told him he doesn't use, 
he only smokes weed and drinks beer. Defendant did not stop talking about these 
unrelated issues during the entire time he looked over the form. 
13. While Defendant handled the form and simultaneously talked about the 
subjects noted above, Det. Moosman interjected, "sign right here", "now do you under 
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stand all this stuff?", "and if you understand and agree with it, sign there ... and I'll sign 
as a witness". 
14. This Court is unable to determine from the written form, the CD recording, or 
the testimony elicited at the preliminary examination in what sequence Defendant 
initialed the various places where his initials appear on the form, or whether Defendant 
actually read the various admonitions on the form, much less whether Defendant 
comprehended any of the admonitions. 
15. It is clear to this Court that Defendant did not focus exclusively on the 
admonitions written on the form. 
16. It is clear to this Court that Defendant was distracted from the admonitions 
on the form by the matters about which he spoke with Det. Moosman. 
17. It appears to this Court that Defendant signed the form voluntarily. 
18. This Court is unable to determine from the evidence that if Defendant was in 
fact previously advised of his Miranda rights, who so advised him, whether such 
admonitions were adequately recited to Defendant, whether Defendant understood 
each of such rights, or whether Defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived each of 
such rights. 
Upon the foregoing, this Court now enters these : 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. By a preponderance of evidence, this Court concludes that Det. Moosman did 
not read from the form to Defendant or otherwise verbally advise Defendant that 
anything Defendant said would be used against him in court, that Defendant had a right 
to have an attorney present during questioning, or that questioning would cease if 
Defendant asked it to cease or asked for an attorney. 
2. This Court is not persuaded, by a preponderance of evidence, that Defendant, 
by his own reading of the written waiver of rights form, was adequately advised that 
anything he said would be used against him in court, that he had a right to have an 
attorney present during questioning, or that questioning would cease if he asked it to 
cease or asked for an attorney. 
3. This Court is not persuaded, by a preponderance of evidence, that prior to the 
interview by Det. Moosman, Defendant was previously adequately advised of his 
Miranda rights by other police officers, that Defendant understood each of such rights, 
or that Defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived each of such rights. 
4. This Court is not persuaded, by a preponderance of evidence, that Defendant 
knowingly waived his right to the presence of an attorney, that he was aware that his 
statements would be use against him in court, or knew that he could stop the 
interrogation at any time. 
Upon the foregoing, this Court now enters this: 
5 
O 4 
ORDER 
It is hereby ordered that all of Defendant's statement made to Alpine-Highland 
Det. Moosman on or about 1 May, 2007 at the Lehi City Police Department be and 
hereby is suppressed and shall not be admitted as evidence at the trial of this matter. 
Dated this day of Y-OoYu^jr^ ^ , 2008. >H**f>X, 
By the Court:
 Q 
Claudia* LaycoGk^f; 
Fourtl\|Bdicia||PiBti1ct Court 
Approved as to form: 
Craig dhm 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
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GARETH BOZUNG, 
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APPEAL 20080480-SC 
JUDGE CLAUDIA LAYCOCK 
BE IT REMEMBERED that this matter came on for hearing 
before the above-named court on February 6, 2008. 
WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by 
counsel, the following proceedings were held: 
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(Short inaudible, away from mic). 
Was that your trash or move your 
P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 
(February 6, 200) 
THE JUDGE: Mr. Means is lying in wait there and I 
just wondered. 
MR. MEANS: 
THE JUDGE: 
crap? 
MR. JOHNSON: (Short inaudible, away mic) never 
wants it. 
Trash. 
And you are calling? 
Gareth Bozung. 
We don't know how the computer didn't 
put his sentencings on but I caught it yesterday when I went 
through so... 
MR. MEANS: Yes, we anticipated it. He's number 
three and then the add-ons, six, seven and eight. 
THE JUDGE: Right. Where do you want to start? 
MR. MEANS: Wherever you want to start, 
Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Let's start with number three. Are 
you two ready to discuss the defendant's motion, or I'm 
sorry, the state's motion for rehearing or does the state 
want an opportunity to reply before we discuss that? 
MR. JOHNSON: We can discuss that, Your Honor. 
MR. MEANS: 
THE JUDGE: 
MR. MEANS: 
THE JUDGE: 
PAGE 3 
1 THE JUDGE: Okay. How about you? Are you ready 
2 to discuss that, Mr. Means? 
3 MR. MEANS: We can. 
4 THE JUDGE: Go ahead, Mr. Johnson. It's your 
5 motion. 
6 STATE'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
7 ARGUMENT BY MR. JOHNSON 
8 MR. JOHNSON: The feels that in light of the 
9 ruling that a, the court made note of the lack of evidence 
10 that the state presented with respect to the prior Miranda 
11 warnings the defendant was allegedly given by other Lehi 
12 officers on another case and we failed to make a complete 
13 record for the court a, to go to its ruling that a, we should 
14 be afforded the opportunity to put that evidence on and then 
15 the court can, we could brief that issue, the court could 
16 still make the same ruling. That way we have a full record 
17 a, should we decide to take it up anywhere else. 
18 THE JUDGE: Okay. Tell me how under either the 
19 civil rules or the crime rules of procedure you get a second 
20 bite of the apple. 
21 MR. JOHNSON: It's more of a, more of a court of 
22 equity I guess that we're asking for, Your Honor. I don't 
23 see any other way, as Mr. Means points out. But a, that's 
24 a,— 
25 THE JUDGE: Since, frankly my concern, 
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Mr. Johnson, is that what you want me to do is give the 
state a second chance on a hearing that was set and on 
arguments that were made, and after hearing my ruling and 
realizing the state didn't cover everything the state wants a 
second chance. Now, in what other hearing or what other 
procedure do we do this? We don't do it with jury trials, 
we don't do it with preliminary hearings. I'm pretty sure, 
my recollection is on the case law on preliminary hearings 
you don't get to file again and you don't get a second shot 
unless there's newly discovered evidence. 
MR. JOHNSON: And admittedly it's a unique 
situation, Your Honor, and that's why we just in consulting 
the attorney general's office a, thought that this was the 
best thing to make sure that we got a record of a, one way or 
the other and a, want to proceed in this manner. 
THE JUDGE: The attorney general's office thinks 
that there's a legitimate way other than my being kind and 
equitable for you to get a second hearing? 
MR. JOHNSON: I didn't get any more direction than 
that. No, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Mr. Means? 
ARGUMENT BY MR. MEANS 
MR. MEANS: Well, I think the discussion that a, 
at the bench that counsel had is exactly on point as to what 
I would argue and have argued in my response. I can 
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understand why the attorney general wants there to be a 
record made. I think that's all we're saying is we'd sure 
like it to be better. But I don't think that there is any 
procedural vehicle to do that. I think you're absolutely 
right that a, that there's, there's no newly discovered 
evidence, there's nothing that would justify reopening it. 
The state mentioned that they wanted to have a chance to put 
that in, they had that chance, it wasn't put in. I think 
your ruling was proper under the evidence you were given, and 
I don't see that there's a procedure to continue to reopen 
things and try to put on more evidence. 
So I've made my argument in my response. 
THE JUDGE: Anything else? Mr. Johnson? 
MR. JOHNSON: The state would submit 
COURT'S RULING 
THE JUDGE: All right. Well, I've read both of 
the memoranda. And a, I think Mr. Means is correct when he 
says the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure do not 
specifically provide for a motion for a rehearing. And 
number two he said the state is seeking a reconsideration. 
Generally the motions for reconsideration that I see, which 
I turn down as often as I possibly can because they are 
frowned upon by the appellate courts and there is no place 
for them in the rules of procedure, generally such motions 
to reconsider are based on maybe newly discovered case law 
T-l 7\ /T1 tZ 
that they didn't find before. But even then they are 
generally not filed with an attempt to supplement the 
factual record. And that is exactly what the state wants 
to do here is now bring in more facts, have an opportunity 
to put on another officer to testify and bolster the state's 
claim that the Miranda rights were carefully given and 
unlawfully given. 
This is nothing more than a second bite at the 
apple having heard my ruling and a, my conclusion that the a, 
there was no evidence put on by the state that showed that 
he had recently received good Miranda warnings from another 
officer that might have possibly saved what I perceived to 
be very poor Miranda warnings in this case. 
And I agree with Mr. Means on his number three, a, 
his third point that the closest would be, the closest 
analogous procedure would be a motion for a new trial. 
But that evidence could have been put on by the 
state at that time. Certainly with reasonable diligence 
they could have had the officer there and they should have 
thought of that. This is nothing new, nothing stunning, 
nothing that I certainly didn't think about as I prepared 
for that hearing. 
And so I deny the motion. I think that the state 
is going to have to stand on the record as it is if they want 
to take this up on appeal. 
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All right. So I deny the motion for a rehearing, 
ask Mr. Means to prepare an order. 
And where do you want to go from there? 
MR. JOHNSON: The state would like some time to 
file its a, get with the AG's Office and file its brief to a, 
to appeal the ruling. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. So do it on an interloc 
without dismissing first? 
MR. JOHNSON: Yes, that would be ideal. In the 
meantime I guess the state can review, Mr. Means has provided 
us with a copy of the proposed order and findings of fact 
from— 
THE JUDGE: From last week or from two weeks 
ago? 
MR. JOHNSON: Yes. If we can have a week to 
review those and a, a,— 
THE JUDGE: All right. 
MR. JOHNSON: — contact the court, file an 
objection if we want. Otherwise we'll submit it and have the 
court order and then we'll take that up. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. So it doesn't slip through the 
cracks let's do this. I want to put it on for a review as to 
the status of the case on March 12th at 1:30. 
MR. JOHNSON: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: And at that time hopefully by then 
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the orders are signed. 
call off the hearing. 
MR. JOHNSON: 
THE JUDGE: 
If the orders are signed then we can 
Okay. 
If not you guys can tell me what's 
going on. 
MR. JOHNSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: All right. Okay. That takes us to 
the sentencing. I have three files here. Did the parties 
receive the a, memo, the PV report signed by Darrell Healy 
and Daniel Lanchard as well as the updated PSI? 
MR. JOHNSON: The state, the state has. 
MR. MEANS: The defendant did. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Thank you. So everybody is 
ready to roll? 
MR. MEANS: I think so 
SENTENCING 
DISCUSSION BY MR. MEANS 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Mr. Means, would you like to 
address those documents? 
MR. MEANS: Yes, Judge. First of all, let me 
just point out that whichever sentence you intend to impose 
I believe that the correct credit for time served is 180 
days, 189 days. It's, their recommendation is based upon 
him appearing on January 23rd, which we did but it was 
continued. 
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THE JUDGE: And I added 14 days on to what they 
had. I thought I came up with something different than what 
you're saying. Let me look. 
MR. MEANS: Oh, actually— 
THE JUDGE: They had 162 days and then I added 14 
and that was 176. 
MR. MEANS: Looking at page five they gave him 
credit for 13 days on one case and 162— 
THE JUDGE: Right. 
MR. MEANS: — on the other. 
THE JUDGE: Right. 
MR. MEANS: So I'm saying— 
THE JUDGE: So most, on two of the cases he gets 
176, on one of the cases he gets a — 
MR. MEANS: 189. 
thought. 
right. 
for— 
THE JUDGE: Was it 13? 13 plus 14 would be 27 I 
MR. MEANS: Oh, I see what you're doing. All 
THE JUDGE: Separately per case. 
MR. MEANS: As long as you see to give him credit 
THE JUDGE: Yes. 
MR. MEANS: 
you do it is fine. 
— for the time in whatever fashion 
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THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. MEANS: The additions to his matrix in points 
that the department made were that a, he was on pretrial 
release when these three matters occurred, when they were 
committed. That's correct. He was actually first brought 
before the court on the matter you just heard, number three 
on the calendar, and that occurred in March and he appeared 
before any of these occurred. He appeared on that case 
before any of these were charged. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. MEANS: So I think they're correct in giving 
him those points. 
They've also given him points for a DUI which 
occurred in 2004 in Salt Lake City which is listed as case 
number 045004875. 
THE JUDGE: You're on page— 
MR. MEANS: Six. It's the sixth entry. 
THE JUDGE: Dated 6-20-04? 
MR. MEANS: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. MEANS: I've actually looked that up on the 
state's computer and don't find that number. 
MR. JOHNSON: And I have a copy of the docket that 
I got Midvale to send me because it was unclear from the 
criminal history. 
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THE JUDGE: So does it have that same case 
number? 
MR. JOHNSON: 045004875? 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. JOHNSON: Yes. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Have you shown that to 
Mr. Means? 
MR. JOHNSON: I have not. I've shown it to the 
AP&P. 
THE JUDGE: I'm just curious. Is it really for 
DUI and reckless driving? 
MR. JOHNSON: It says local, local ordinance DUI— 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. JOHNSON: — /reckless driving. 
THE JUDGE: Oh really? /reckless driving? 
MR. MEANS: Two points, Judge. This is a Midvale 
justice court and that's why it's probably not in the 
computer and a— 
THE JUDGE: All right. So that looks like it's 
good. 
MR. MEANS: It notes a DUI was dismissed, wrong 
way on a one-way street was dismissed. Never obtained 
license was dismissed. And then it says local DUI and 
reckless driving ordinance, guilty. I think that's a way of 
saying reckless driving. Defendant remembers it as being a 
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reckless driving. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. MEANS: So with that proof then I suppose 
those points are correct. 
THE JUDGE: All right. 
MR. MEANS: My a, central argument with regard to 
what the, in opposition to what the department has 
recommended is essentially the same as my motion that the 
court consider entering, or entering his conviction on 
Count 1 of case number 2801 which was a first degree felony 
as a second degree felony under Rule 402. I'll just address 
those together. It's properly scored, it's properly placed 
on the three matrixes we've got according to the points that 
he has. 
Nevertheless, I would argue that this court should 
enter the conviction on the first degree felony as a second 
degree felony for these reasons. If you look at all of the 
three matrixes, on the other two convictions he falls 
clearly within probation and a, I would assume the court 
would in a normal case grant him probation under those 
circumstances. 
In the case where he's convicted of a first degree 
felony that, of course, puts him over into a category which 
would call for 78 months, six and a half years of 
incarceration as opposed to what would be a normal probation 
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with normal sentence of jail and supervision and treatment 
on the other cases. 
I don't see Gareth is different than every other 
defendant that I represent with drug charges. His history is 
substantially similar. He's had periods of irresponsibility 
in his life. He has no violence in his life. He's used 
drugs in the first place that are illegal so they are, they 
are wrong to use in the first place, these are 
nonprescription drugs, he's used them more than he should 
and it's severely impacted his life. That given, that's 
almost everybody I stand with. I don't see that a, his 
position is any way unique from a, from other defendants that 
I represent. 
Even with regard to these charges he's the same 
man standing in front of you. All of these charges occurred 
within a four month period between March and August of last 
year. In one of these cases he's pled to a second for his 
drug use, in another of these cases he's pled to a third for 
his drug use, and in this case he was found guilty of a 
first for his drug use. Same person, same period of time, 
same behavior, same a, general picture of who he is. Just 
by choice of prosecution on how they want to handle it he 
gets treated substantially more severely in one case than 
the other two. That's the prosecution's right. 
But it's also the court's right to look at the 
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overall picture of who he is, what is needed to rehabilitate 
him, what's needed to address him for accountability 
purposes. And frankly, as a citizen I don't see that I 
need six and a half years of his life incarcerated. He'll 
certainly be dry for that period of time, or at least 
hopefully be dry, I don't know what the prison what access 
he'd have. And that's what we would achieve. But as a 
citizen I don't need that bed space taken up for six and a 
half years for someone with his pattern of behavior. 
I think that, that this court should grant the 
motion to lower that conviction to a second degree felony. 
If you were to do so he would slide over to Column I rather 
than Column E because it's a second degree possession only 
crime. And I should note there is no such thing as a first 
degree possession only crime. But by the general character 
of the way the matrix is laid out, within the last couple 
of years they've added two columns which were for possession 
only. I think that in third degree felonies and second 
degree felonies but not first degree felonies. And I think 
that's some indication of how the system generally wants to 
address possession only charges. They are treated 
differently, they are treated as something that is less 
severe than if he were to act out against a person or against 
a person's property. He's harming mainly himself. And a, 
and I think that that's why those two additional columns were 
V>&rZTT 1 K 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
entered. 
If he were over in Column I with the same points 
that he has he'd be in probation on this case too. I think 
that's what's needed. I think that, I think that meets 
accountability. I think that meets rehabilitation. He was 
on probation on two other cases in the past simultaneously, 
one class A misdemeanor and his previous felony. It was for 
a period of six years. It was extended to six years because 
the felony came near the end of his probation period on the 
misdemeanor so it was extended. He tells me he was never 
revoked and reinstated. Am I correct? 
THE DEFENDANT: Pretty sure. 
MR. MEANS: I hope that's correct. He tells me he 
was never revoked and reinstated. It was simply extended 
because of the new conviction. He was terminated 
unsuccessfully because at the end of the time period he 
hadn't paid his fine in full. Am I correct? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
MR. MEANS: He's just not a person from past 
history or from behavior in these cases that I think this 
court needs or society needs to impose a sentence of that 
severity. And so I'm asking that the court consider our 
motion to reduce it to a second degree felony and impose the 
sanction accordingly. 
As an alternative, if you don't think that's a 
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proper ruling, I still think that the court could impose 
probation based upon a first degree felony. I, and, and 
because that's what I think is called for in this case that 
he be placed on probation. And he would have a first degree 
felony hanging over his head. If he were dumb enough to 
violate probation knowing where he is right now then maybe he 
would deserve a severe jail sentence by the court. 
In either alternative it's my argument that a, all 
of the facts and all of the circumstances in this case call 
for him to be placed on probation rather than be sentenced to 
prison. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Before we go any further my 
clerk had put in the file and I had forgotten it, we received 
an ex parte letter, I've made copies for each of the parties 
from I think a family member or someone. So I'll just let 
you take a look at that before you conclude your 
presentation, Mr. Means. 
Anything else you want to say after reading that, 
Mr. Means? 
MR. MEANS: It just jogged my memory as to one 
point. He was denied a, referral to the Door Program and I, 
if I read the report correct it was simply because the 
recommendation and points and placement on the matrix 
suggested a prison recommendation and so that's were he was 
denied Door. But I think he's a perfect candidate for, for 
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that program. 
THE JUDGE: All right. Mr. Bozung, anything you 
want me to know? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. I had a problem with drugs 
in my life. I know I'm responsible for the actions I've 
made and the choices I've made and I'm responsible for the 
consequences. I believe I should have a chance on 
probation. I don't want this life anymore, I want to 
better myself. I want to get rid of my drug addictions. I 
need tools to help me. I love my family, I want to have a 
family of my own. And I just I want to live life without 
being in trouble and being addicted to drugs. And that's 
about it. 
THE JUDGE: All right. Thank you. 
Mr. Johnson? 
ARGUMENT BY MR. JOHNSON 
MR. JOHNSON: I think it's disingenuous to say 
that the only person Mr. Bozung is hurting is himself when we 
have a 2002 conviction for distribution basically of drugs. 
You know, I think a, certainly Josh Rozeka's (phonetic) 
family would disagree with that comment. Then we have 
(inaudible word) probation and he's amenable to probation. 
I mean, in his backpack where the drugs is found hand 
warmers around a urine sample. I mean, he's actively trying 
to beat urine tests, a, these kind of things that should be 
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privileges on the outside if he doesn't want to be 
incarcerated that he has to comply with probation instead of 
trying to beat the system. 
I think with his, his history and the current 
offenses that he been convicted of a, you know, the jury, 
the jury heard the evidence. The legislature has set the 
degree where it's at for a, for a reason. And a, you know, 
the other cases Mr. Means mentions it's based on the 
prosecution's discretion, I mean, those were plea bargains. 
I mean, they were charged as firsts as well. And a, he took 
advantage of a plea bargain. And so it's, we weren't just 
selectively prosecuting one case or the other, but that was 
something that was struck in the grand scheme of things after 
the first degree felony case. 
So the state feels that the recommendation is 
appropriate, the matrix as are is scored properly and that he 
should go to prison 
FURTHER COMMENT BY MR. MEANS 
MR. MEANS: Let me respond briefly, Judge. None 
of it matters much but I think it I would like to make a 
record. Mr. Rozeka (phonetic) is responsible for his own 
behavior just like Mr. Bozung is. 
THE JUDGE: Well and frankly, folks, that case 
isn't in front of me. Isn't that the other case? 
MR. MEANS: It is the other case but— 
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THE JUDGE: And if you want to go ahead and 
address that. But my view is that I can't take that case 
into consideration in sentencing him today. 
MR. MEANS: The other point I want to make, 
Your Honor, is that his other pleas were pleas, they were 
reduced by plea bargain. But as long as the matter was 
brought up I will tell you that the offer that was made as a 
global offer to him was is that he plea to at least one 
first degree felony. So whether they were reduced or not a, 
he was put in a position of either accepting the first 
degree felony or going to trial, and that's why he went to 
trial. 
Again I say it doesn't matter much. But my point 
is still the same, a first degree felony is more than is 
called for and his background and his behavior and what's 
needed to rehabilitation and true accountability. 
THE JUDGE: All right. Anything else? Anyone 
else wanting to be heard? 
MR. JOHNSON: The state will submit it 
COURT'S RULING 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Let me talk first about the 
'07 case ending in 2801. This is the case that was tried 
to a verdict by a jury, and this is the case in which 
Mr. Means has filed a motion to enter the judgment on the 
next lower degree. 
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I deny the motion. I find that with his history 
and for whatever reasons he went to trial on this matter and 
it was a, tried well by both sides and the jury found him 
guilty as charged. 
And I agree with the prosecution. This is where 
the legislature has put this particular a, kind of a case. 
Even though he wasn't dealing in this case, because of the 
prior, and because of the drug-free zone, it ends up bumping 
up to a first degree felony. And that is the chance that 
he and others in the same position take when they possess 
Schedule-2 or Schedule-1 controlled substances, other than 
marijuana is a Schedule-1. And so I think that a, given 
the history and the character of the defendant and the 
nature of this crime that a conviction on his record for a 
first degree felony is appropriate. 
So I deny the motion to enter judgment in the next 
lower degree on the first degree felony in the ? 07 case 
ending in 2801 . 
Let me next address the criminal history as found 
in the amended, with two Ms report. 
Turning to page six, having in mind also the 
matrices, the three different matrices that have been 
prepared by Adult Probation and Parole. Hang on. I just 
want to turn to one of the ones I've got all marked up. 
Well, it depends on which report you're looking at, which 
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page it's on. But let me see if I can get to the one. 
I'm looking at page six on the report that covers the two 
different cases, the 2801 case and the 3285 case. 
As I look at his history in the adult record 
starts in 2000. His juvenile history had at least nine 
misdemeanors and one felony. Don't know what the felony 
was. Starting in 2000 when he turns 18 we have a Class B 
DUI, a Class A burglary. So it must have been either 
vehicle burglary or something reduced down. We have the 
next item which is something that just totally befuddles me, 
a tampering with evidence a Class C misdemeanor. I don't 
know how you get there. 
MR. JOHNSON: It's got a lot of attempts on it. 
THE JUDGE: That just makes no sense at all. I 
have no clue what that's about. 
Next we have a Class A attempted possession or use 
of a controlled substance, so obviously a Schedule-2 that 
was knocked down with an attempt from a felony. And a 
Class A after that, attempted... I'm sorry. This is where 
we have the one third degree felony in his history as an 
adult engaging in criminal enterprises, and then it has in 
parentheses a distribution of a controlled substance. 
So from 2000 to 2002 he has some misdemeanors and one 
felony. In 2004 he has the case that we've discussed a, 
out of a justice court that was apparently some sort of a 
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reckless driving or maybe a DUI under an ordinance, but the 
record apparently also shows that the DUI was dismissed. 
So it's reckless something. 
And then we get to 2007 with the three cases that 
are in front of me. As I indicated I cannot take into 
account anything that happened in the other case that was on 
the calendar today. It's not before me for sentencing. And 
I make my decision based on what I have in front of me, these 
three cases and the criminal history. 
As I look at these three cases the one and only 
reason he's going, that the recommendation from AP&P is 
prison is that there is one first degree felony. Otherwise 
anybody else given this same history would not have a 
recommendation for prison. 
MR. JOHNSON: Your Honor, if I might note he had 
two successful probations that are listed there. 
THE JUDGE: I saw them. 
MR. JOHNSON: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: And one of them I think they indicated 
the problem was he didn't keep a job and he had more problems 
with controlled substances, and I can't remember the other 
thing. Was it failure to report? 
MR. JOHNSON: I think so. 
THE JUDGE: I'm going off the top of my head 
here. It was there in one of the reports. Anyway, there 
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were three reasons that were given, not just that he didn't 
pay the fines as he claimed. 
Given all of that and the fact that on two of these 
matrices he ends up in the intermediate sanctions and on the 
third he ends up in the imprisonment category. 
Possibly against my better judgment and definitely 
against the wishes of the state and AP&P, Mr. Bozung, I'm 
going to give you one last chance. I'm not going to send 
you to prison this time. You're going to be on probation 
on these three cases. 
Now, you have to go into this probation knowing 
that AP&P didn't want you, and twice now they've told me they 
don't want you. They stuck to their original a, 
recommendation. They actually went back and looked at the 
matrices very carefully and found more points against you. 
But I'm going to give you the chance. 
THE DEFENDANT: Thank you. 
THE JUDGE: There is one other thing, counsel, 
that I wrote myself a note on, and I'm, nobody argued it. 
But my understanding has always been that the date of a 
conviction is the date of sentencing, not the date of entry 
of plea. And I'm not so sure that they're doing it right, 
because they're doing these dates of conviction and adding 
up the points on the matrices as the date that he entered 
his plea. But for all other purposes a, the date of 
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conviction is always considered to be the date that the 
conviction is truly entered and that doesn't happen until 
sentencing. 
MR. MEANS: May I address that, Your Honor, just 
briefly? 
THE JUDGE: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MR. MEANS: I did look at that and I think that it 
makes a difference in points but not a difference in his 
level. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Well, and it didn't in the end 
make a difference in how I viewed the case. And I've thought 
about this a great deal. I've looked at this and spent a 
great deal of time looking at this while the jury was out so 
that I understood what they had done. 
And I am, Mr. Bozung, looking at this in a global 
manner as suggested by your attorney. But it also means if 
you come back and you blow probation that we'll look at it in 
a global manner again and say you're gone. Okay? 
THE DEFENDANT: I know. 
THE JUDGE: So if, I think you've watched me long 
enough that you know it's not hollow threats. And I'll, if 
you don't do well I'll send you up. 
THE DEFENDANT: I know that. 
THE JUDGE: I'm not going to have much choice. 
So on each of these cases let's do the maximums. 
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On 071403285, Count 1 was reduced to third degree 
felony. I'll order that you serve no more than five years in 
the Utah State Prison. And that's the only conviction in 
that case as I recall. 
On the '07 case ending in 1958 I'm looking at the 
second amended information. On Count 2, possession or use 
of a controlled substance with a prior conviction, a third 
degree felony, that's the meth charge, you entered a guilty 
plea. I will order that you, and that was a second degree 
felony. I will order that you serve not less than one but 
not more than 15 years in the Utah State Prison. 
On Count 3, obstructing justice, that was reduced 
to a third, I'll order no more than five years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
And Count 4, possession of drug paraphernalia in a 
drug-free zone, a Class A misdemeanor, I will order that you 
serve one year, 365 days in the Utah County Jail. 
I will run those concurrent within the case. But 
I will run them consecutive to the first case. 
And on the '07 case ending in 2801 the jury found 
you guilty of possession or use of cocaine, a controlled 
substance, in a drug-free zone. I'm looking at the verdict 
form. It doesn't have the prior conviction on it. Did we 
just leave that off the verdict form? 
MR. JOHNSON: Yes, because we did. We bifurcated 
P & at? 7f\ 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
it. 
THE JUDGE: Oh, that's right. Because we 
bifurcated. Okay. All of a sudden I thought oh, stop. 
Okay. With a prior conviction. So it's a first degree 
felony. I will order that you serve not less than five years 
but it may be life on that charge. 
And then on the Class A misdemeanor drug 
paraphernalia charge in a drug-free zone I will order that 
you serve 365 days in the Utah County Jail. 
And I will run those concurrently with each other 
within the case but consecutive to the other two cases. 
So as you can see I'm trying to make the stakes 
high so that you'll hang in there. Okay? 
While I've got my clerk at that case I'll work 
backwards. On 2801 I will order fines in the amount of 
$700 and a surcharge of 595. Oh, let me make sure I did 
that right. $595. And court security fees of $50. 
On the '07 case ending in 1958 I will order that 
you pay a fine in the amount of $600, and a surcharge of 
$510, and one, two, three court security fees of $75. 
And in the '07 case ending in 3285 I will order 
that you pay fines in the amount of $500, $425 surcharge, 
and a $25 court security fee. 
I will stay the maximum terms on all three cases, 
place you on probation supervised by Adult Probation and 
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Parole for a period of 36 months. During that 36 month 
period you're to obey all laws state, local and federal, 
report to the court and Adult Probation and Parole whenever 
required, and keep your address current with the court and 
AP&P at all times. 
As to the jail time in each case I'm going to 
order that you serve 270 days in the Utah County Jail. And 
to keep things simple I'm going to order that you get 176 
days credit in each case. 
I'm going to order that you successfully complete 
the Out program. And given the fact that I've placed you on 
probation, if AP&P can get around the guidelines that have 
been set up and you are approved for the Door program I 
will allow you to participate in the Door program. And if 
you're not allowed in the Door program, any other treatment 
program that AP&P orders you into I will order that you 
successfully complete, including its aftercare. 
I will order that you will submit to any curfews 
that they order. And if they want you to do electronic 
monitoring as part of their probation, not through the jail 
but as part of their probation you will do electronic 
monitoring. I will order that you maintain employment. I 
will order that you have absolutely no alcohol, and that you 
do not go to places where alcohol is the chief item of 
order. Obviously you can't have any illegal controlled 
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substances. That goes without saying but I'll say it 
anyway. 
Is there anything in the standard order that I've 
left out? 
MR. JOHNSON: I don't know if I missed it, you 
mentioned comply with substance abuse treatment. 
THE JUDGE: Yes, I did. 
MR. JOHNSON: Thank you. 
THE JUDGE: In the end there was no restitution on 
the case at Cal Ranch was there, because they got everything 
back? 
MR. JOHNSON: That's accurate. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. And no restitution in any of 
the other cases that I recall. 
MR. JOHNSON: That's correct. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. I will order that within 24 
hours of your release from the jail you report to AP&P in 
person. No phone calls, in person. Hopefully they will 
come out and see you before you leave. Bottom line is, 
it's your job to find them, it's not their job to find you. 
So that means you need to have a, a place set up to live when 
you get out. Okay? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. So it's in your lap, 
Mr. Bozung. It's your call. Okay. I hope you can pull 
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it off. I think you've done the ARC before and that's about 
the only treatment opportunity that you've had or taken 
advantage of. 
You don't have to be ordered into treatment. 
And I say that because of the letter that came in from your 
family. Nobody has to order you into treatment. And I 
don't think it's a valid excuse to say I've never been 
ordered into treatment. You've got a drug problem, you 
know where you need to go. So please follow through. I 
would like to see you succeed. I've made a lot of people 
unhappy today. So you know, be nice, prove me right. 
Okay. 
THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. MEANS: Thank you. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARETH BOZUNG, 
Defendant. 
DISTRICT No. 071402713 
ORDER IN RE: 
STATE'S MOTION 
FOR REHEARING 
Hon. Claudia Laycock 
This matter came on before this Court on the 6th day of February, 2007, for 
argument on the State's Motion for Rehearing of the Order Suppressing Defendant's 
Admissions. The State was represented by Craig Johnson, Deputy Utah County 
Attorney. Defendant appeared personally and was represented by his attorney of 
record, Thomas H. Means. Having duly considered the parties' written and oral 
arguments, this Court now enters the following findings: 
1. The Utah Rules of Criminal Proceduredio not specifically provide for a Motion 
U 
for Rehearing. 
Q& 
2. A Motion to Reconsider is not specifically provided for in the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. Neither are such motions recognized in the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure1 {Watkiss & Campbell v FOB & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah, 1991)), 
however they have been reviewed as if brought under some other proper rule and 
simply mistitled. /of., at 1064-65. 
3. The most closely appropriate rule of criminal procedure that would govern the 
State's Motion for Rehearing on Suppression Motion would be Rule 24, Motion for New 
Trial. 
4. The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the standard to be used when a 
party seeks to introduce additional evidence in support of a motion for new trial. Such 
evidence "must be such as could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered 
and produced at the trialf.]" State v James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah, 1991). 
5. This Court determines, by a preponderance of evidence, that the State was 
aware of the possible existence of witnesses who could have provided evidence relative 
to Defendant having been advised of his Miranda rights prior to being interviewed by 
Detective Moosman. 
2See Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 81(e) making the civil rules of procedure 
applicable in criminal cases "where there is no other applicable statute or rule ...." 
2 
6. This Court is not persuaded, by a preponderance of evidence, that the State 
could not have produced, with reasonable diligence, such witnesses or other evidence 
relative to the issue at this Court's original hearing on 23 January, 2008. 
Upon the foreaoing, this Court denies the State's Motion for Rehearing. 
Dated this ±-L day of February, 2008. 
^OfUj|^ dud[i6ial District 
Approved as to form: 
Craig |amnson 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
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